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Abstract: We study the relationship between financial performance and responsibility in the 
banking industry. Given the wide diversity in business models and operations, this relationship 
needs to be studied at the level of specific industries. We contribute to the debate about financial 
and social performance in the banking industry by using highly detailed responsibility and financial 
performance information, which helps to understand why this relationship exists and how the 
relationship evolves over time. We rely on a diverse international sample for the period 2002–2015 
and use a wide range of financial performance measures next to various specific indicators for 
corporate governance, environmental, and social performance. By using simultaneous equation 
system estimations to address the causality between financial performance and responsibility, we 
find that the Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio is significantly and positively associated with 
responsibility indicators. As such, stronger institutions appear to be able to act in a more responsible 
manner and such responsibility signals banks’ health. We also establish that the global financial 
crisis did have a profound impact on the finance-responsibility nexus. We show that there are 
changes in the underlying relationships in this nexus during the post-crisis period compared to the 
pre-crisis period. Furthermore, such changes are different between countries with high and low 
income, civil and common law, single and multiple supervision authorities, and central bank and 
non-central bank supervision.   




This study investigates if and how responsibility in banking interacts with financial 
performance. Banks play a crucial role in the financial system and interact with economic 
development [1]. Responsibility relates to the performance of banks regarding governance, 
environmental, and social issues and operations that go beyond what is required by laws and 
regulations [2]. Recently, politically motivated groups and non-governmental organizations insist 
financial institutions take responsibility for social ills such as human rights violations and climate 
change by virtue of the activities they finance. For example, Amnesty International [3] requires banks 
commit to stop all financial activities related to illegal arms or arms destined to an illegal use. Thus, 
we try to clarify the relationship between how banks try to live up to such responsibilities and their 
financial performance, which we call the finance-responsibility nexus. We contribute to the academic 
debate by thoroughly investigating this nexus at the banking industry level for a large international 
sample. This allows us to account for banking specifics and for a more direct interpretation of the 
findings. It also allows us to use bank-specific measures of financial performance, such as capital 
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ratios and net interest margins, and relate these to banks’ performance on governance, social and 
environmental characteristics. This results in a richness of insights as to how responsibility and 
financial performance relate; such richness usually gets lost when multiple industries are investigated 
at the same time. Banks process financial information. As they specialize in the production and 
processing of information, we feel they are very well equipped and positioned to gather, assess and 
use non-financial information as well. As financial intermediaries manage risks and funds on behalf 
of other households, it is crucial they have a complete and detailed overview of what firms do and 
what the effects are. Both their financial structure and their business model set them apart from other 
types of business, which motivates our industry-specific analysis of the banking industry (next to the 
fact that several studies advocate the case for industry-specific analysis of the social and financial 
performance relationship, see [2]). 
We are not the first to investigate the relationship between responsibility and financial 
performance for banks. Several other studies have tried to associate different characteristics of 
financial institutions to their responsibility, e.g., Anginer et al. [4] study the relationship between 
banks’ capitalization strategies and executive compensation, and Hu and Scholtens [5] study how 
banks comply with international codes of conduct on social and environmental issues. Wu and Shen 
[6] argue that the more banks engage with responsibility, the better their financial performance. Jo et 
al. [7] establish that banks’ environmental performance improves their operational efficiency and as 
such results in better financial performance. In their review study, Chih et al. [8] find that most 
research tends to confirm that banks’ responsibility is to be significantly and positively associated 
with their size and returns. The reasoning behind these findings often is that stakeholders highly 
appreciate the efforts of banks regarding responsibility. Then, we wonder why most banks do not 
always act in a responsible manner. If being responsible were beneficial for financial performance, 
one would expect owners pressure bank managers to improve performance by acting in a responsible 
manner. However, this is not the case, as is being evidenced by ongoing criticism regarding the lack 
of responsibility in the banking industry [9]. Therefore, we reflect upon the reasons offered regarding 
the relationship between finance and responsibility in the banking industry and put these to the test. 
The urge for responsibility results from the fact that private costs and benefits can differ from 
the social costs and benefits of doing business. This was clearly the case with the financial sector in 
the global financial crisis, where perverse incentive mechanisms resulted in bankruptcies and 
economic crises and led to the bailout of numerous banks [10–13]. The global financial crisis also 
resulted in calls for responsible conduct of the finance industry and for improvements in the quality 
of governance as well as legislation that explicitly addressed the responsibility of banks in their 
business operations [14,15]. Several initiatives have been set up to stimulate this debate and to try to 
achieve financial firms integrating responsibility in their business model. For example, the Equator 
Principles address how banks can account for social and environmental issues in project finance, and 
the Principles for Responsible Investment stimulate investors to value responsible investment to 
enhance governance, and in turn returns and improve risk management. Such initiatives highlight 
the importance of responsibility and the increase in attention for it after the global financial crisis 
[16,17]. Therefore, we also want to find out if the global financial crisis left its mark on the finance-
responsibility nexus. More recent are the European Union’s Circular Economy Action Plan and the 
Commission’s Action Plan on Financial Sustainable growth. Given banks’ crucial role in fostering 
economic growth, a thorough understanding about how responsible conduct affects their 
performance, and the other way around, seems crucial for achieving policy objectives. 
We also investigate how income and country-level institutions affect this nexus [18]. Dixit [19] 
argues that a responsible business community can mitigate the impact of poor institutions and reduce 
corruption. Kotchen and Negi [20] study the Global Environment Facility and find that greater co-
financing can be associated with better project evaluations. However, Cull et al. [21] report that the 
social and economic impacts of microfinance are only modest and that it involves substantial 
subsidies. Huang [22] establishes that the interaction between global financial markets and the 
economy is a key factor influencing sustainable development. Especially, output volatility has a 
negative effect on savings and increases natural resource depletion. In this respect, our study relates 
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to the work of Liang and Renneboog [23] who investigate drivers of responsibility in general, and to 
that of Lins et al. [24] who study the role of responsibility with non-financial firms during the financial 
crisis. The paper also relates to Goss and Roberts [25] and Wu and Shen [6–26], who investigate how 
responsibility influences bank performance based on generic measures of responsibility.  
We rely on an international sample for the period 2002–2015. Given the economic nature of 
banks, we use bank specific performance indicators, such as banks’ net interest margins, cost-to-
income ratio, non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratios, as the banking business is qualitatively 
different from other types of business [27–29]. For our proxies of responsibility, next to the generic 
indicators that are used in the empirical literature so far [6,7,26,30], we also use several components 
of social, environmental and governance performance and relate these to the bank specific indicators. 
For example, in the social realm, we account for product responsibility, health and safety, human 
rights, community, employment, diversity, training and development. As to environment, we 
account for resource use reduction, product innovation, and emission reduction. For governance, we 
investigate board structure and functions, compensation policy, shareholder rights, vision and 
strategy. This granularity is important because aggregated responsibility indicators are not very 
informative [31].  
Further, we study whether the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 did affect the finance-
responsibility nexus, as it gave rise to a lot of pressure from supervisors and regulators regarding 
improving banks’ health and the way in which they operate [24,32,33]. Responsibility might be a 
strategy to help protect banks from such pressure. Banks are important agents affecting economic 
development and therefore are regulated and supervised carefully. However, the recent global 
banking crisis and its aftermath severely damaged banks’ reputations. This is demonstrated by bank 
bailouts and scandals like interest rate rigging. In order to restore their role and reputations, bank 
regulation and supervision was intensified [13]. Further, previous studies suggest that differences in 
economic and institutional development across countries might influence the effectiveness of and 
interest in responsibility [24,34]. Therefore, as to their impact on the finance-responsibility nexus, we 
also investigate the role of per capita income, the legal system, and the design of bank supervision 
[24,35] in the relationship between social and financial performance in the banking industry. We 
study if differences in those institutional developments across countries help explain how the recent 
global financial crisis shapes the relationship between social and financial performance. 
The main findings are that we cannot support the view that responsibility systematically 
improves financial performance in the banking industry. However, we establish that capitalization 
(Tier-1 ratio) significantly and positively relates to responsibility indicators. We do not observe other 
financial or non-financial performance indicators having a consistent relationship with other proxies 
for social performance. We find that the global financial crisis left its mark on the interaction between 
financial and responsibility performance in the banking industry. In particular, it shows that the 
finance-responsibility nexus did weaken after the crisis. Further, economic development, legal 
systems, and the way in which bank supervision is organized do matter for the finance-responsibility 
nexus. 
To find out about the finance-responsibility nexus in the banking industry, we first briefly refer 
to the studies that relate social and financial performance; next, we introduce the literature that 
focuses on this relationship within the banking industry and position our study before we present 
the hypotheses that will be tested in the remainder of this manuscript. 
2. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance  
The Commission of European Communities [36] defines Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
as companies integrating social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
voluntarily engaging with their stakeholder base. This definition accounts for a role of CSR within 
the firm. Dahlsrud [37] observes that CSR has distinct dimensions, namely economic, environmental, 
social, stakeholder, and voluntary.  
The research on CSR has generated a wide array of ideas as to why and how the non-financial 
performance of a firm might be associated with its financial performance. Margolis and Walsh [38] 
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argue CSR has become a trend, as society holds firms responsible for the problems they cause and 
expects they contribute to their solution. Bénabou and Tirole [39,40] argue that as information about 
business’ practices has become accessible, stakeholders can more easily assess whether a firm acts in 
line with their interests. Further, they contend that the costs of externalities such as pollution and the 
awareness about these costs have risen significantly. Due to their increasingly globalized activities, 
companies face new problems to which they have to respond. Then, corporate responsibility is a way 
to manage firms’ externalities [2]. 
The study of financial performance and CSR has yielded a very extensive empirical literature. 
Friede et al. [41] report that more than 2000 studies investigate this relationship. Most studies arrive 
at a small but significant and positive association between the two (see also Margolis et al. [42]). 
Industry factors appear to play a significant role, but there is little theory in this respect. Waddock 
and Graves [43] observe that there are substantial differences in CSR disclosure across industries. 
Therefore, Cottrill [44] and Heal [2] contend that investigations failing to incorporate industry level 
realities may be fatally deficient. Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria [45] and Heal [2] argue that firms in a 
particular industry can be either more or less socially responsible because of the specific nature of 
their activities. Simpson and Kohers [46] argue that differences between industries with regard to 
CSR are so dominant that research needs to stick to the single industry perspective. Fernando et al. 
[47] contend that corporate environmental policies that mitigate environmental risk exposure create 
shareholder value (see also [48]).  
The majority of studies about financial performance and CSR base their hypotheses on taxonomy 
provided by Preston and O’Bannon [49]. Rivera et al. [50] try to substantiate the different ideas based 
on economic theory. Preston and O’Bannon [49] first question the sign of the relationship: It may be 
positive, negative or non-existent. Next, they question causality: Does responsibility affect financial 
performance, or is it the other way around? From a mix of different notions—sometimes labelled as 
theories in the literature, they arrive at six testable hypotheses. First is that there is a positive 
relationship between social and financial performance and that social performance is leading. An 
example is the social impact hypothesis, which holds that high levels of responsibility lead to high 
levels of financial performance. This results from stakeholder theory as proposed by Freeman [51] 
(see also [50]). This theory assumes that a firm needs to invest in its relationships with key 
stakeholders to be financially successful [52,53]. Then, investments in CSR contribute to better 
relations with a firm’s stakeholders and ultimately lead to increased financial performance [43]. Lins 
et al. [24] argue that CSR activities especially help build social capital and trust (see also [19,20]). 
Second is that there is a negative relationship and that social performance is leading. An example 
is the trade-off hypothesis, which closely relates to the view of Friedman [54] who argued that there 
are few measurable benefits of CSR while the costs are substantial (see also [50]). For example, 
managers would invest in responsibility to pursue their own interests, which would not maximize 
shareholder wealth. As such, it could worsen the competitive position of the firm and reduce its 
financial performance. Harris and Raviv [55] argue that shareholders should have more control over 
important decisions, but assume they all have the same preferences. However, Dimson et al. [53] 
argue that some investors in fact are activists and show that activist owners who focus on corporate 
social responsibility can improve companies’ returns and governance.  
Third is that there is a positive relationship with financial performance leading social 
performance. An example is the available funds view, which holds that investments in CSR are costly, 
and therefore depend on the financial resources of the firm [56] (see also [50]). Managers can invest 
internally available funds in environmentally or socially advantageous activities without being 
restricted with the difficulties of raising external financing. Even though managerial control on 
internal cash flows raises concerns for the classical agency problems [57,58], spending those funds on 
responsible investments may reduce management’s power and, in turn, create benefits for all 
stakeholders [59].  
Fourth is that financial performance is leading and there is a negative relationship with social 
performance. Here, the managerial opportunism view is an example as it argues because managers 
act to maximize their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ 
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interests [60,61] (see also [50]). For example, after good financial performance managers like to 
reward themselves and spend less on CSR. However, after poor financial performance management 
may spend more on CSR or philanthropy to cover up or justify its poor financial performance [22,49]. 
Preston and O’Bannon [49] also allow for a positive or negative bidirectional relationship (see also 
[43]), i.e., their fifth and sixth hypothesis respectively, but do not offer a specific reasoning as to why 
this might be the case.  
2.1. Responsibility in the Banking Industry 
Most empirical studies control for industry effects in the regression models and include size, and 
sometimes R&D and marketing, in the regression model. It shows that industry effects matter [2,44]. 
This motivates the case for studying the finance-responsibility nexus at the industry level. Many 
studies exclude financial firms from their analysis because they are special. In particular, banks’ 
leverage is out of range with that of non-financial firms and they are subject to much more intense 
regulation than other firms [62]. This is because they create and manage money and, from an 
economic perspective, are intermediaries: Their services help clients manage intertemporal financial 
surpluses and deficits as well as financial risk [63,64]. To do so, banks take on risks themselves for 
which they are rewarded by fees and markups. Therefore, banks’ balance sheets and income 
statements are very different from that of other industries as they predominantly consist of 
(intangible) financial assets [62].  
The unique characteristics of banks motivated scholars to suggest that the banking industry 
might also be different when it comes to the responsibility-performance nexus [2,43,45,46]. Several 
country studies investigate CSR in the financial industry (e.g., [15,18,46,65] for the US; [66] for the 
Netherlands; [67] for Lebanon; [68] for Spain; [69] for Bangladesh; [70] for India; [71] for Egypt; [72] 
for Nigeria; [73] for Pakistan; [74] for the Czech Republic. The ways in which responsibility is dealt 
with shows wide variation: from actual resource usage to generic ratings, and from topical aspects to 
broad categories. The predominant finding is that responsibility results in financial outperformance 
([66,74] being an exception). Cornett et al. [15] examine banks’ responsibility in the US in the context 
of the global financial crisis and establish that socially responsible banks outperform. In addition, 
there are several studies using an international sample (for example [4–8,26,75–78]. The results from 
multi-country studies generally point in the same direction as those for individual countries. This 
line of research suggests it is worthwhile to account for economic development and institutional 
design in our research framework (see also [13,23,24]). 
Chih et al. [8] provide an overview of the literature and conclude that many key characteristics 
of social performance are positively associated with financial ratios and performance indicators in 
the banking industry (see also [79]). Wu and Shen [6] argue that the more banks engage with 
responsibility, the better their financial performance as reflected in several bank efficiency and 
performance ratios. They confirm these findings in later research [26,78]. Ciciretti et al. [76] confirm 
this too and suggest more responsible banks have lower cost of debt and equity. Mallin et al. [77] 
study the case of Islamic banks and arrive at similar conclusions. They suggest causality runs from 
financial performance to responsibility. Platanova et al. [80] also study Islamic banking but conclude 
responsibility precedes financial performance. Jo et al. [7] argue banks’ environmental performance 
improves their operational efficiency and as such results in better financial performance. Most of 
these studies suffer from small sample size; only [4,7,24,65,76] report more than 1000 bank-year 
observations in their sample. The use of responsibility and financial performance variables differs 
widely and we find that hypotheses are not always clearly stated or tested. Related is variety in the 
use of estimation methods, especially when it comes to addressing endogeneity problems. This 
criticism is reminiscent of the critical reflection regarding the study of CSR in general [42,81,82].  
Hence, we feel it is important to conduct an industry-specific study for the banking industry 
regarding the finance-performance nexus. We try to add value to the literature by using a broad set 
of both financial performance and social performance variables, where the existing literature usually 
focuses on just a few generic measures that allow cross-industry comparison. Given the two highly 
different types of variables, we will engage in an approach that controls for the direction of the 
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causation by using a three Stage Least Square (3SLS) estimation. As such, we take advantage of the 
correlation in the error terms to arrive at estimates that are more efficient and perform a generalized 
least squares estimation for this 3SLS process that creates a consistent estimate for the covariance 
matrix of the equation disturbances in 3SLS estimations. This allows us to pinpoint the interactions 
between the different types of performance in detail. Further, we rely on a large international sample 
[7,24], specifically compare the nexus before and after the global financial crisis [15,33], and account 
for development and institutions [34,43]. In our view, such a contribution is of interest as banks are 
under scrutiny of their regulators and the public at large, especially since the global financial crisis. 
By using a broad sample for a prolonged period, and by investigating whether the global financial 
crisis made a difference, we want to establish what drives banks’ responsibility, if there is a cost, and 
whether development and institutions matter. 
2.2. Hypotheses 
To investigate the finance-responsibility nexus for banks, we have four hypotheses. For the first 
two, we closely follow the setup suggested in Preston and O’Bannon (1997) [49] and further 
developed in Rivera et al. (2017) [50]. The background of these hypotheses relates to the response to 
the concerns about banks’ health and their way of doing business as, traditionally, banks are regarded 
as the culprits in all types of societal ills and wrongdoing [83]. Consequently, especially banks will 
invest in their responsibility policies as a response to such pressure [2,46]. Their governance may be 
affected because of extensive regulation [84,85], and wide diversity of their stakeholders, which can 
result in potential conflicts [86]. Many operations of banks are subject to strict regulation by monetary 
and supervisory authorities and so is the composition of the board and the requirements regarding 
the skills and character of its members [87]. The extensive regulation gives individual banks very 
little leeway to deviate from the industry standard as set by their regulators. 
We first assume there is a causal relation running from responsibility to financial performance 
(H1). Rivera et al. mention there are several views as to why this might be the case. For example, they 
suggest it is neoclassical finance theory, which sees responsibility as an attribute that is sold. Further, 
it signals the firm’s mission or balances claims of multiple stakeholders. They also relate it to 
institutional theory and to the natural resource view of the firm. Last is that Rivera et al. [50] assume 
the relationship can be negative too when environmental protection consumes financial resources. 
When the relationship is significant and positive, this would confirm these different views. Motivated 
by Waddock and Graves [43], Rivera et al. [50] also are open to financial performance driving social 
performance. Here they assume good management and social performance are synonyms, or that 
financial resources enable social performance. Therefore, we also test whether causality runs from 
financial performance to responsibility (H2). When this relationship is statistically significant and 
positive, we assume it supports the available funds view. When negative, it suggests the opportunism 
view holds (firms improve financial performance at the expense of social and environmental 
wellbeing). 
Our third hypothesis relates to the impact of the global financial crisis on the relationship 
between responsibility and financial performance. Here, we specifically relate to [15,33] for the US, 
who show that responsibility conditions firms’ financial performance in the crisis period. As we have 
to make do with a lack of theory, our third hypothesis is of an exploratory nature. We test whether 
the crisis did significantly change the ways in which the two performances interact.  
Our fourth and last hypothesis is also of a probing nature as we lack a grounding framework. 
This hypothesis relates to the role of economic and institutional development in relation to the 
finance-responsibility nexus. As there are few studies to highlight the potential role of these 
[24,34,43], but there is no clear-cut transmission mechanism as to how and why so, we feel we can 
only have this as an exploratory hypothesis. It holds that economic and institutional development 
matter regarding the finance-responsibility nexus. The null being there is no difference between any 
country subsets. We will relate the role of economic and institutional development on the finance-
responsibility to the banking industry’s response to the global financial crisis as well.  
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3. Materials and Methods  
3.1. Materials 
We investigate the relationship between banks’ responsibility and financial performance. We 
use an international sample of firms for the period 2002–2015. We extract financial and non-financial 
firms having data for responsibility scores in the ASSET4 database of Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope/Datastream. We exclude countries with less than 10 observations during the sample 
period. To be included in our final sample, we require all firms having firm level financial items from 
Worldscope/Datastream. We use ASSET4 data to measure responsibility for several reasons. First is 
that it is a global dataset and covers extensive data items with more than 7000 firms and 40,000 
firm/year observations for the time period of 2002–2015. Further, it includes details of more than 250 
responsibility items as well as encompassing scores for environmental performance, social 
performance, and governance. Several academic studies use this database too when examining the 
interaction between CSR and financial performance [30,79,88–91].  
ASSET4 consists of four generic pillars, which represent different dimensions: corporate 
governance, economic, environmental, and social. We leave out the economic pillar, as we specifically 
want to associate financial performance with responsibility measures. ASSET4 is based on 
(normalized) z-scores, which reveals a company’s performance relative to the average performance 
of all other rated companies. The use of such ratings information has its limitations [90,92]. Firstly, 
the ratings derive from the firm’s definition and evaluation of its non-financial performance and are 
not directly related to scientific measures of sustainable development. To this date, however, this 
concern applies to all responsibility ratings and seems insurmountable as long as there is no 
standardized and independent auditing and verification with respect to non-financial performance. 
Another limitation of responsibility ratings is that they are largely process-based as they primarily 
focus on managerial principles and processes. They mainly capture a firm’s intention, and not its 
effort, to address corporate social, governance, and environmental issues. Examples of process-based 
measures include data points that answer questions such as “Does the company have a policy 
regarding the independence of the board?”, or “Does the company monitor the impact of its products 
or services on consumers or the community more generally?”, or with respect to financial firms “Does 
the company show in its role as an asset manager that it promotes socially responsible investments?”. 
Orlitzky et al. [81] stress that researchers must decide whether process-based measures are as 
appropriate measures of non-financial performance. They argue that their use is equivalent to 
acknowledging effort. From an economic point of view, effort would pertain to resources used in the 
production process and it should somehow show up in the financial information, but the efficiency 
of these processes can highly differ. Another concern is the aggregation of data. This assumes the 
data is commensurable. We think it is unlikely that this assumption holds for responsibility 
indicators. In addition, aggregation requires a decision about the weight to apply to each component 
(see [93] for a discussion about commensurability and fungibility as well as the role of taste and 
values). Even though Asset4 aggregates information about detail items for governance 
environmental and social performance, there is no scientific framework that can be used to arrive at 
this decision. 
We use the banks’ scores on corporate governance performance, environmental performance, 
and social performance as proxies for corporate social responsibility and test our hypotheses for these 
measures. The information about governance, environmental and social performance is available at 
a general level as well as at a more detailed level. The definitions of responsibility variables are in 
Appendix A, along with a definition of our proxies for bank specific financial performance variables 
such as the ratio of net interest income to earning assets, Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio, the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans, the cost to income ratio, and excess stock market returns. Banks 
report these variables to inform their stakeholders. The net interest margin reflects the business banks 
engage in; banks with more lending operations will have higher margins than those that engage in 
advising and mediating, where fees and provisions are the main revenues. Hence, this is not 
reflecting performance but merely revealing the source of the bank’s revenues. Tier 1 is a capital 
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adequacy ratio that reflects the solvency or capital strength of the banks. The Tier 1 ratio reflects the 
highest quality of capital held in relation to the risk-weighted assets; the total capital adequacy ratio, 
as an alternative proxy for the quality of capital, includes all capital components (results with this 
proxy are highly similar but not reported for the sake of brevity). A bank’s non-performing loans 
signal the quality of the loan portfolio; a high ratio implies relatively poor quality. The cost to income 
ratio is an indicator of bank efficiency: banks with low ratios are most efficient. The excess stock 
market return signals the investor’s valuation of the bank in relation to the general stock market. To 
account for the possibility of mistakes or outliers, all variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 
one percentile levels. The final sample is unbalanced pooled cross-sectional data with more than 2400 
bank/year observations. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the overall sample and correlations coefficients. Our 
investigation is motivated by an industry-specific analysis suggesting that there is potential to 
augment the analysis of [15,24,33]. This table also compares the pre-crisis (2002–2007) and the post-
crisis (2010–2015) years and shows that (1) environmental responsibility in the banking industry 
improved while governance and social performance deteriorated, and (2) all financial performance 
proxies improved in post crisis period (2010–2015) relative to the pre-crisis period (2002–2007), as the 
differences are statistically significantly different from zero. These characteristics suggest we should 
investigate our hypothesis about the changing relationship between financial and non-financial 
performance in relation to the crisis. We also report correlations coefficients between responsibility 
scores and financial performance proxies in the banking industry. This too shows a high correlation 
between environmental and social performance (0.77). 
We now turn to the ways in which we will test the hypotheses about the direction and sign of 
the CSR and financial performance relationship in the banking industry, the impact of the global 
financial crisis on these relationships, as well as on the role of development and institutions. 
3.2. Methods  
To test the sign and direction for our hypotheses, we investigated the relationships between 
financial performance and responsibility and accounted for their sequence. Our aim was to identify 
if and which of the financial performance variables might have determined the responsibility scores, 
and vice versa. Most of the empirical literature on this relationship in the banking industry tended to 
rely on Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimations. Weighted Least Square (WLS) estimation takes 
unequal representations of sample countries with the different number of observations into account 
for especially a few countries having larger number of observations. As we had a large international 
sample, WLS would provide an attractive alternative estimation method. However, WLS estimations 
do not consider the issue that the direction of causation between governance, environmental and 
social scores and firm financial performance is unknown. Therefore, we had to amend this strategy. 
To this extent, we controlled for the direction of the causation with a system of equations using a 
three Stage Least Square (3SLS) estimation, which took advantage of the correlation in the error terms 
to arrive at estimates that were more efficient, as widely documented in the literature (e.g., [42,94,95]). 
By using two equations, we designated both financial performance and responsibility as endogenous 
variables. The predictive values of both endogenous variables were determined using all exogenous 
variables in the two equations and the instrumental variables identified the difference between the 
equations. We performed a generalized least squares (GLS) type estimation for the 3SLS process 
which created a consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances.   
The first equation regressed firm financial performance against the (separate) responsibility 
scores (i.e., governance, environment, and social). As controls, we used one-year lags of the financial 
performance variable, size, the ratio of loans to deposits (LoanDeposit). Bank size was important 
because larger banks can have higher financial and social performance than small banks do since they 
can create efficiency and draw public attention [15]. The ratio of loans to deposit indicates available 
access funds for banks to pursue responsibilities better [15]. We also controlled with the country level 
private credit percent of GDP (Pr.Crd.GDP) by deposit money banks and other financial institutions. 
This variable controlled for the size of the banking sector across countries, reflecting institutional 
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development. This is in line with [23] who examined legal origin when explaining responsibility 
scores Private credit to GDP is a proxy that closely aligns with our methodology as it allows for 
variation over time [96]. We identified lagged financial performance and private credit to GDP as 
instruments of the financial performance equation. We expected that, as the size of the credit market 
was different across countries, private credit to GDP helped determine the financial performance, but 
not necessarily responsibility, which primarily was driven by country and industry institutions and 
regulations and thus depended on country and industry practices [23,96]. Further, we examined how 
the causal relationship between corporate social and financial performance in the banking industry 
differed during the crisis period relative to the pre- and post-crisis periods. We took years 2008 and 
2009 as crisis years (based on [97–99]) and introduced a dummy to compare this period with others. 
Then, we interacted the dummy representing the crisis period with responsibility in the financial 
performance equations as well as with financial performance in the equations determining the 
responsibility scores [15–24]. Thus, the first equation was as follows: 
Financial Performanceit = b0 + b1 Financial Performanceit-1 + b2 Responsibility Scoreit + b3 Crisis 
+ b4 Crisis*Responsibility Scoreit + b5 Sizeit + b6 LoanDepositit + b7 Pr.Crd.GDPit + ei 
(1) 
Next, Equation (2) had governance, environment, and social responsibility scores as the 
dependent variables and one financial performance measure was included each time as an 
explanatory variable. Further, we used two additional instrumental variables, namely the averages 
of the scores by country/year and those by country/industry. We computed peer group averages as 
instruments for each responsibility score separately. However, [100] showed that the choice of an 
instrument as the mean of the group’s dependent variable produced inconsistent estimates and 
suggested the fixed effects estimator was consistent and should be used instead. Unfortunately, 
responsibility scores do not have sufficient variation to allow for the use of bank fixed effects. [48] 
used the peer group averages as instruments for a focal firm’s financial policies and motivated this 
because of the existing empirical evidence in the literature for the impact of peer firms’ polices on 
individual firm-level financial policies. This is quite similar for the case of responsibility policies. 
Therefore, the analysis was performed with the help of the second equation:  
Responsibility Scoreit = b0 + b1 Financial Performanceit + b2 Crisis + b3 Crisis*Financial 
Performanceit + b4 Sizeit +b5 LoanDepositit + b6 Mean_RESSCORE (Country/Year)it + b7 
Mean_RESSCORE (Country/Industry)it + ei 
(2) 
To account for development and institutions (as motivated in [4,18,19,24,34]), we split the sample 
countries along per capita income, legal system, and along their way of organizing supervision of the 
banking industry and ran regressions based on two equations above. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for financial performance measures and responsibility scores by industry. This table reports the number 
of firm/year observations, the mean and median values of the financial performance measures and responsibility scores for banking 
sample and provides a comparison between post and pre crisis years and correlation coefficients of performance scores and responsibility 
scores for the sample. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. The significance of 
differences between means and medians is based on a t-test for mean differences and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for median differences, 
and *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% levels 
 Total Pre Crisis Post Crisis Post Crisis Minus Pre Crisis 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean  Median  
CGVSCORE 2432 46.04 48.58 605 50.59 58.95 1436 44.68 46.17 −5.91 *** −12.79 *** 
ENVSCORE 2432 48.85 42.91 605 47.54 35.89 1436 49.88 47.71 2.33  11.82  
SOCSCORE 2432 54.52 55.26 605 58.13 61.89 1436 52.94 51.83 −5.19 *** −10.06 *** 
Net Interest Margin 2432 0.0270 0.0236 605 0.0235 0.0215 1436 0.0284 0.0254 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 
Tier1 Cap_Adq Ratio 1852 0.1177 0.1143 211 0.0923 0.0840 1292 0.1248 0.1210 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 
Non Performing Loans 2266 0.0293 0.0178 550 0.0150 0.0079 1346 0.0354 0.0211 0.02 *** 0.01 *** 
Cost to Income Ratio 1913 0.4203 0.4185 429 0.5441 0.5351 1202 0.3660 0.3761 −0.18 *** −0.16 *** 
Excess Stock Return 2432 0.0240 0.0109 605 0.0130 0.0086 1436 0.0259 0.0125 0.013  0.004  
 
Correlations  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
CGVSCORE [1] 1        
ENVSCORE [2] 0.4205 * 1       
SOCSCORE [3] 0.4923 * 0.8190 * 1      
Net Interest Margin [4] −0.0095 −0.2060 * −0.0980 * 1     
Tier1 Cap_Adq Ratio [5] 0.0332 −0.0842 * −0.0536 0.2256 * 1    
Non Performing Loans [6] −0.1026 * 0.1126 * 0.0870 * 0.0366 0.0237 1   
Cost to Income Ratio [7] 0.0315 0.2469 * 0.3079 * −0.2655 * −0.2455 * 0.0215 1  
Excess Stock Return [8] −0.0664 * −0.0282 −0.028 0.0760 * 0.1102 * −0.0822 * −0.0443 1 
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4. Results 
In this section, we provide the analysis of our regression estimations where we use bank specific 
financial performance measures and both encompassing and detailed responsibility indicators. We first 
provide a detailed analysis of various responsibility and financial performance measures and their 
interrelations. Then, we investigate whether the global financial crisis affected the finance-responsibility 
nexus in the banking industry. Last is the analysis of the influence of per capita income, legal system, 
and the way in which bank supervision is organized. 
4.1. Main Analysis 
Table 2 presents the results of 3SLS estimations of the simultaneous equation system regarding the 
effect of a bank’s responsibility (corporate governance (CGVSCORE), environmental (ENVSCORE) and 
social (SOCSCORE) scores) on financial performance, as well of that of financial performance on these 
responsibility indicators (we also perform OLS and WLS estimations to provide a comparison across 
alternative estimations methods and report the findings in Appendix C). At this stage, we ignore the 
role of different types of development (i.e., economic, institutional, regulatory), but leave this for our 
analysis of the impact of the global financial crisis (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). The results are reported for 
CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and for SOCSCORE separately. For all three responsibility scores Table 2, we 
report the results for financial performance equations in the first part, and the results for responsibility 
equations in the second part.  
Table 2 first relates CGVSCORE to banks’ financial performance indicators. We find that 
CGVSCORE and Net Interest Margin (NIM) positively and significantly affect each other, which 
supports both H1 and H2. This suggests that especially banks with more lending business, i.e., more 
traditional commercial banks, will have better governance compared to those with relatively more fee-
based income. The other significant effect we observe is a positive effect of banks’ TIER1 capital 
adequacy ratio on CGVSCORE. In this case, the causality appears to run from finance to responsibility 
and not the other way. This confirms the available funds view (H2) regarding the relationship between 
governance and financial performance in the banking industry [50]. Next we report the results for the 
relationship between ENVSCORE and financial performance. We find that ENVSCORE significantly 
decreases NIM and increases Cost to Income Ratio (CIR). These results suggest that better 
environmental performance lowers banks’ efficiency and that banks high on environmental 
responsibilities are not the most cost-efficient ones. This finding confirms the trade-off view (H1) as 
more responsibility reduces banks’ financial efficiency. Banks with higher non-performing loans and 
cost to income ratio have higher environmental performance. However, the positive and significant 
effect of Tier 1 capital adequacy on ENVSCORE indicates that banks adequately backed up by equity 
improve their environmental performance, which confirms the available funds hypothesis (H2). The 
results with SOCSCORE show that, as in the case of environmental performance, a higher SOCSCORE 
is associated with a higher cost to income ratio and vice versa, supporting H1. This indicates that being 
socially responsible comes at a cost. On the other hand, the positive and significant effects of NIM, Tier1 
and Excess Return on SOCSCORE show that banks with sufficient margin, better capitalization and 
outperformance have higher social responsibility. This confirms the available funds hypothesis (H2). 
Both OLS and WLS estimations reported in Appendix C provide similar findings as 3SLS 
estimations do. Even though there are some differences across alternative estimations, the similar 
estimation results of 3SLS with especially WLS in most of the cases indicate that our 3SLS estimations 
are not affected by countries represented with varying number of observations in our sample. These 
comparative results indicate the importance of the 3SLS estimations, where two equations are 
simultaneously estimated, to be able to identify the direction of the effect. 
Among the control variables, the estimated coefficients of the lag of financial performance proxies 
are always highly significant and most of the time reduce the role of country level variable, Private 
Credit to GDP. In the responsibility equations, size and two instrumental variables (the means of 
responsibility scores by country/year and by country/industry) are major determinants of responsibility 
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indicators. Moreover, according to Variance of Inflation Factors (VIFs) reported in Appendix D, we do 
not detect any major correlations among independent variables. The reason for VIFs being a little higher 
for the means of responsibility scores of CGVSCORE by country/year and by country/industry is that 
CGVSCOREs are stable over the sample period. However, the VIFs of the other two responsibility scores 
are very low.  
Based on Table 2, we conclude that there mainly is support for the available funds hypothesis, 
especially in the case of the Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio. There is some support for the trade-off 
hypothesis and none for the social impact and opportunism hypotheses. In the case of corporate 
governance and the net interest margin, there is some evidence of positive synergy. 
In Table 3, we report the relationship with more fine-grained components of responsibility in each 
of these three domains with 3SLS estimations only (see Appendix A for the description of these 
indicators). More specifically, we have the following components of the generic governance score 
(CGVSCORE); board function (CGBF), board structure (CGBS), compensation policy (CGCP), vision 
and strategy (CGVS), and shareholder rights (CGSR). For the generic environmental score 
(ENVSCORE), we have emission reduction (ENER), product innovation (ENPI), and resource reduction 
(ENRR). For the generic social score (SOCSCORE), we have product responsibility (SOPR), community 
(SOCO), human rights (SOHR), diversity and opportunity (SODO), employment quality (SOEQ), health 
and safety (SOHS), and training and development (SOTD). 
In Table 2, it shows that governance had a significant effect on NIM only. Table 3 shows that banks 
with higher scores regarding board function, board structure and compensation policy have higher 
NIM, but a higher score on vision and strategy reduces margins, both supporting H1. Among those, 
only vision and strategy have a bidirectional relationship with banks’ NIM. This is consistent with both 
H1 and H2. The other statistically significant positive effects of the governance components on financial 
performance are as follows: board structure and compensation policy on TIER1; board function and 
compensation policy on NPL; vision and strategy on CIR; and vision and strategy on ESR. On the other 
hand, there is also a significantly negative relationship between board structure and CIR, and between 
board function and shareholder rights with ESR. When we test H2 by assessing the effects of financial 
performance proxies on the fine-grained governance components, we confirm the general finding in 
Table 2 of positive and significant effects of net margins and TIER1 on governance. Table 3 also shows 
that these effects are primarily based on vision and strategy for NIM and on board structure and vision 
and strategy for TIER1. However, we also observe the positive and significant effects of NPL on board 
function and board strategy, and of the CIR and ESR on shareholder rights.  
Table 2. The relationship between responsibility scores and financial performance for the banking 
industry. This table reports 3SLS estimations for simultaneous equation system of the relationship 
between responsibility scores and bank specific financial performance measures for the effect of crisis 
years with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and SOCSCORE. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
All regressions control year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard 
errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Corporate Governance (CGVSCORE) 
 Net Interest  
Margin 
Tier1 Cap_Adq Non Performing  
Loans 
Cost Income  
Ratio 
Excess Return 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.918 *** 0.830 *** 0.979 *** 0.598 *** −0.064 *** 
 [0.006] [0.014] [0.009] [0.019] [0.020] 
CGVSCORE 0.098 ** 0.353 0.219 −0.008 −0.04 
 [0.047] [0.245] [0.160] [0.023] [0.026] 
Size −0.028 *** 0.004 −0.01 0.014 *** −0.010 ** 
 [0.009] [0.045] [0.029] [0.003] [0.005] 
LoanDeposit −0.03 0.19 0.907 *** 0.062 *** −0.039 ** 
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 [0.027] [0.147] [0.095] [0.009] [0.015] 
Pr.Crd.GDP −0.018 0.198 * −0.018 −0.058 *** −0.057 *** 
 [0.023] [0.109] [0.073] [0.009] [0.012] 
Constant 0.648 *** 1.954 −1.177 ** −0.103 * 0.503 *** 
 [0.191] [1.254] [0.569] [0.054] [0.094] 
R-squared 0.927 0.753 0.86 0.654 0.083 




0.007 *** 0.004 *** 0.001 0.056 −0.008 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.039] [0.140] 
Size 0.064 *** 0.061 *** 0.059 *** 0.052 *** 0.057 *** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
LoanDeposit −0.004 0.044 *** −0.004 −0.007 0.005 
 [0.010] [0.012] [0.010] [0.014] [0.010] 
Mean_SCORE 0.383 *** 0.238 *** 0.358 *** 0.314 *** 0.368 *** 
(Country/Year) [0.034] [0.042] [0.035] [0.041] [0.050] 
Mean_SCORE 0.651 *** 0.758 *** 0.675 *** 0.684 *** 0.666 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.035] [0.041] [0.036] [0.044] [0.043] 
Constant −1.252 *** −1.268 *** −1.156 *** −0.973 *** −1.106 *** 
 [0.066] [0.105] [0.062] [0.070] [0.092] 
R-squared 0.669 0.668 0.662 0.596 0.673 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
Environmental Score (ENVSCORE) 




Ratio Excess Return 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.921 *** 0.833 *** 0.977 *** 0.576 *** −0.063 *** 
 [0.006] [0.014] [0.010] [0.020] [0.020] 
ENVSCORE −0.145 * 0.167 0.007 0.089 *** 0.068 
 [0.077] [0.392] [0.279] [0.025] [0.044] 
Size 0.006 −0.004 0.002 −0.001 −0.024 *** 
 [0.016] [0.084] [0.058] [0.005] [0.009] 
LoanDeposit −0.007 0.23 0.936 *** 0.057 *** −0.050 *** 
 [0.028] [0.147] [0.095] [0.009] [0.016] 
Pr.Crd.GDP −0.005 0.264 ** 0.019 −0.058 *** −0.060 *** 
 [0.021] [0.103] [0.069] [0.007] [0.011] 
Constant 0.084 2.075 −1.366 0.153 * 0.740 *** 
 [0.289] [1.718] [1.009] [0.085] [0.157] 
R-squared 0.926 0.753 0.86 0.649 0.077 




0.005 0.008 *** 0.004 *** 0.094 * 0.121 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.048] [0.147] 
Size 0.137 *** 0.140 *** 0.137 *** 0.128 *** 0.132 *** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] 
LoanDeposit −0.009 0.003 −0.009 −0.057 *** 0.007 
 [0.014] [0.017] [0.014] [0.018] [0.014] 
Mean_SCORE 0.062 0.048 0.011 0.243 *** 0.031 
(Country/Year) [0.045] [0.048] [0.042] [0.054] [0.042] 
Mean_SCORE 0.700 *** 0.717 *** 0.676 *** 0.664 *** 0.696 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.027] [0.032] [0.028] [0.033] [0.030] 
Constant −2.494 *** −2.584 *** −2.465 *** −2.335 *** −2.427 *** 
 [0.088] [0.138] [0.082] [0.089] [0.106] 
R-squared 0.588 0.608 0.592 0.596 0.578 
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Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
Social Score (SOCSCORE) 
 Net Interest 
Margin 





Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.923 *** 0.830 *** 0.977 *** 0.582 *** −0.061 *** 
 [0.006] [0.014] [0.009] [0.019] [0.020] 
SOCSCORE −0.084 0.389 0.046 0.082 *** 0.042 
 [0.077] [0.378] [0.262] [0.027] [0.043] 
Size −0.007 −0.033 −0.003 0.002 −0.018 ** 
 [0.015] [0.072] [0.048] [0.005] [0.008] 
LoanDeposit −0.008 0.184 0.932 *** 0.056 *** −0.049 *** 
 [0.029] [0.154] [0.097] [0.009] [0.016] 
Pr.Crd.GDP −0.004 0.297 *** 0.023 −0.055 *** −0.059 *** 
 [0.021] [0.109] [0.072] [0.007] [0.012] 
Constant 0.303 2.518 −1.283 0.077 0.635 *** 
 [0.259] [1.535] [0.811] [0.076] [0.132] 
R-squared 0.926 0.754 0.86 0.65 0.079 




0.016 *** 0.008 *** 0.002 0.107 ** 0.403 *** 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.044] [0.154] 
Size 0.119 *** 0.114 *** 0.110 *** 0.108 *** 0.114 *** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
LoanDeposit −0.007 0.02 −0.014 −0.048 *** 0.019 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] [0.017] [0.015] 
Mean_SCORE 0.216 *** 0.167 *** 0.187 *** 0.292 *** 0.196 *** 
(Country/Year) [0.043] [0.046] [0.043] [0.049] [0.049] 
Mean_SCORE 0.694 *** 0.764 *** 0.711 *** 0.644 *** 0.680 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.027] [0.029] [0.027] [0.034] [0.034] 
Constant −2.203 *** −2.239 *** −2.009 *** −1.920 *** −2.149 *** 
 [0.080] [0.119] [0.073] [0.080] [0.110] 
R-squared 0.593 0.643 0.595 0.581 0.465 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
Table 3. The relationship between components of responsibility scores and financial performance. 
This table reports 3SLS estimations for the relationship between bank specific financial performance 
measures and the components of responsibility scores with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and 
SOCSCORE. The definitions of components and all other variables are given in Appendix A. All 
regressions control year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard errors 
presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 


















Net Interest Margin Ratio (NIM) 
Component of 0.124 *** 0.104 ** 0.107 ** −0.136 * 0.061 
CGVSCORE [0.043] [0.045] [0.043] [0.076] [0.064] 
R-squared 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 
Component of CGVSCORE Equation 
NIM 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002 
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 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
R-squared 0.671 0.656 0.653 0.547 0.294 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Tier1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (TIER1) 
Component of 0.139 0.487 ** 0.452 ** 0.019 0.034 
CGVSCORE [0.215] [0.228] [0.221] [0.375] [0.345] 
R-squared 0.748 0.749 0.748 0.748 0.748 
Component of CGVSCORE Equation 
TIER1 0.001 0.004 *** 0 0.008 *** 0 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
R-squared 0.659 0.665 0.678 0.578 0.293 
Observations 1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 
Non Performing Loans Ratio (NPL) 
Component of 0.324 ** −0.104 0.263 * −0.319 0.508 ** 
CGVSCORE [0.144] [0.155] [0.149] [0.267] [0.208] 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.849 0.849 
Component of CGVSCORE Equation 
NPL 0.004 *** 0.003 *** −0.001 0.002 −0.002 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
R-squared 0.664 0.642 0.647 0.546 0.318 
Observations 2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 
Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
Component of −0.029 −0.041 ** −0.002 0.124 *** −0.035 
CGVSCORE [0.021] [0.018] [0.020] [0.025] [0.022] 
R-squared 0.592 0.593 0.595 0.593 0.595 
Component of CGVSCORE Equation 
CIR −0.041 0.041 −0.047 0.037 0.305 *** 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.041] [0.052] [0.053] 
R-squared 0.622 0.646 0.602 0.553 0.26 
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 
Excess Stock Return (ESR) 
Component of −0.045 * −0.028 −0.029 0.089 ** −0.096 *** 
CGVSCORE [0.023] [0.025] [0.024] [0.043] [0.034] 
R-squared 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.018 0.018 
Component of CGVSCORE Equation 
ESR −0.136 −0.184 −0.021 0.193 0.366 * 
 [0.138] [0.138] [0.131] [0.162] [0.198] 
R-squared 0.662 0.634 0.664 0.519 0.226 
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 
 
Components of Environmental Score (ENVSCORE) 






Net Interest Margin Ratio (NIM) 
Component of ENVSCORE −0.129 * −0.156 −0.134 * 
 [0.072] [0.106] [0.070] 
R-squared 0.925 0.925 0.925 
Component of ENVSCORE Equation 
NIM 0.006 * −0.001 0.005 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
R-squared 0.571 0.471 0.555 
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Observations 2200 2200 2200 
Tier1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (TIER1) 
Component of ENVSCORE 0.271 0.119 0.039 
 [0.356] [0.520] [0.360] 
R-squared 0.749 0.749 0.748 
Component of ENVSCORE Equation 
TIER1 0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
R-squared 0.608 0.497 0.571 
Observations 1611 1611 1611 
Non Performing Loans Ratio (NPL) 
Component of ENVSCORE 0.141 −0.631 * 0.191 
 [0.255] [0.374] [0.256] 
R-squared 0.849 0.85 0.849 
Component of ENVSCORE Equation 
NPL 0.003 ** 0.005 *** 0.002 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
R-squared 0.573 0.473 0.56 
Observations 2155 2155 2155 
Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
Component of ENVSCORE 0.072 *** 0.174 *** 0.060 *** 
 [0.023] [0.034] [0.023] 
R-squared 0.593 0.589 0.593 
Component of ENVSCORE Equation 
CIR 0.039 0.129 ** 0.076 
 [0.047] [0.052] [0.050] 
R-squared 0.575 0.5 0.556 
Observations 1717 1717 1717 
Excess Stock Return (ESR) 
Component of ENVSCORE 0.044 0.141 ** 0.052 
 [0.041] [0.060] [0.040] 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.021 
Component of ENVSCORE Equation 
ESR 0.068 0.101 0.082 
 [0.140] [0.160] [0.153] 
R-squared 0.566 0.46 0.554 
Observations 2338 2338 2338 
 






















Net Interest Margin Ratio (NIM) 
Component of −0.13 0.027 −0.215 *** −0.064 0.028 −0.066 −0.067 
SOCSCORE [0.096] [0.090] [0.073] [0.066] [0.067] [0.059] [0.086] 
R-squared 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 
Component of SOCSCORE Equation 
NIM 0.021 *** 0.009 *** 0.006 ** 0.012 *** 0.014 *** 0.008 *** 0.013 *** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
R-squared 0.361 0.374 0.525 0.482 0.415 0.559 0.52 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Tier1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (TIER1) 
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Component of −0.036 0.198 0.243 0.409 0.651 * 0.155 0.059 
SOCSCORE [0.461] [0.437] [0.368] [0.325] [0.344] [0.295] [0.442] 
R-squared 0.747 0.748 0.748 0.749 0.749 0.748 0.748 
Component of SOCSCORE Equation 
TIER1 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.007 *** 0.009 *** 0.007 *** 0.004 ** 0.005 *** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
R-squared 0.397 0.405 0.557 0.52 0.444 0.606 0.551 
Observations 1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 
Non Performing Loans Ratio (NPL) 
Component of −0.033 −0.524 * −0.408 0.055 0.645 *** 0.204 0.248 
SOCSCORE [0.322] [0.303] [0.253] [0.223] [0.230] [0.206] [0.305] 
R-squared 0.849 0.848 0.849 0.849 0.85 0.849 0.849 
Component of SOCSCORE Equation 
NPL 0.004 ** 0.002 0.001 0 0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
R-squared 0.355 0.368 0.527 0.484 0.41 0.583 0.519 
Observations 2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 
Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
Component of 0.067 ** 0.071 ** 0.077 *** 0.01 0.074 ** 0.091 *** 0.117 *** 
SOCSCORE [0.028] [0.029] [0.023] [0.024] [0.032] [0.020] [0.030] 
R-squared 0.589 0.587 0.593 0.593 0.563 0.593 0.581 
Component of SOCSCORE Equation 
CIR 0.088 0.075 0.119 *** 0.023 0.032 0.029 −0.023 
 [0.054] [0.048] [0.046] [0.051] [0.053] [0.045] [0.052] 
R-squared 0.379 0.396 0.531 0.482 0.311 0.545 0.508 
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717 
Excess Stock Return (ESR) 
Component of −0.004 0.082 * 0.079 * 0.014 −0.034 0.067 ** 0.034 
SOCSCORE [0.053] [0.049] [0.042] [0.036] [0.038] [0.034] [0.050] 
R-squared 0.024 0.015 0.014 0.021 0.022 0.018 0.022 
Component of SOCSCORE Equation 
ESR 0.505 ** 0.149 0.481 *** −0.145 0.023 0.103 0.502 *** 
 [0.198] [0.157] [0.167] [0.177] [0.142] [0.136] [0.191] 
R-squared 0.143 0.349 0.326 0.48 0.42 0.558 0.311 
Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338 
Regarding our H1 for the ENVSCORE, recall that in Table 2 we found a significantly negative effect 
on NIM and a positive effect on CIR. In Table 3, we confirm the negative effect on margins with energy 
reduction and reduction of resource usage, and the positive effect on efficiency with product innovation 
in addition to the other two components. In addition, product innovation also has significantly negative 
(positive) effects on NPL (ESR). In terms of H2 testing the effects of the financial performance on those 
three components, we find strong positive effects of TIER1 and NPL on ENVSCORE with all three of its 
components, with the exception of NPL on resource reduction. The margin only has a marginally 
significant positive effect on emission reduction. With ESR and CIR, there is only a significant positive 
impact on product innovation. 
When we examine the components of SOCSCORE in Table 3, we have strong evidence for the 
confirmation of the positive effect on bank efficiency. Six of the seven components of social performance 
have significantly positive effects on CIR, but there is only one positive bidirectional effect between the 
ratio and human rights. Moreover, the results confirm the positive and significant effects of NIM and 
TIER1 in Table 2, as both have significantly positive effects on all seven components of social 
performance. ESR has a positive and significant association with product responsibility, human rights 
and training and development. 
The decomposition of the aggregate responsibility scores in more fine-grained indicators in Table 
3 is in line with Table 2. We establish that it is usually some specific constituents that relate to the 
finance-responsibility nexus, not all ‘ingredients’ are relevant. Especially capital adequacy appears to 
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be the driver of responsibility, confirming the available funds hypothesis. There is only scarce evidence 
supporting the other hypotheses. 
4.2. The Role of the Global Financial Crisis 
Due to the economic and social impact of the global financial crisis, we are also interested in how 
it might have affected the relationship between banks’ responsibility and financial performance (see 
[24,33] for non-financials). Cornett et al. [15] address this for a sample of US banks and conclude that 
banks increase their profitability when they are being socially responsible as financial performance is 
positively and significantly related to responsibility. They see a role for bank size, as the biggest banks 
pursue more socially responsible activities than smaller banks. Further, they report large banks see a 
steep increase in responsibility strengths and a steep drop in responsibility concerns after the crisis. 
However, the sequence of the relations is not clear in their study. 
To test the exploratory hypothesis regarding the impact of the global financial crisis (H3), we 
investigate how the crisis affects the finance-responsibility nexus. Table 1 already revealed that banks’ 
financial performance indicators all improved significantly after the crisis and that their governance and 
social scores became worse. This suggests that the financial crisis had an immediate effect on banks’ 
financial performance, which in turn affected banks’ responsibility. Then, pressure from regulators to 
improve financial performance, especially to strengthen the capital base, as well as pressure from other 
stakeholders to behave responsibly, might alter the finance-responsibility nexus. However, it might also 
be the case that the crisis affects banks’ responsibility efforts. This could be because the crisis appeals to 
the ethical stance and conduct of banks. Due to pressure from the public, banks might have felt an urge 
to improve their responsibility. Therefore, we compare pre- and post-crisis periods in order to find out 
whether the crisis did result in any structural change of the bank performance-responsibility nexus. 
Methodologically, we follow the approach used to arrive at our main results in Table 2.  
To compare the pre- and post-crisis periods (2002–2007 and 2010–2015 respectively), we define a 
post-crisis dummy, which takes the value of 1 for post-crisis years (2010–2015) and 0 for pre-crisis years 
(2002–2007). Thus, stand-alone variables representing either responsibility or financial performance will 
show the relationships in pre-crisis years. With the interaction variables for the combined effect of the 
post-crisis dummy with either responsibility or financial performance, we examine how the nature of 
the relationships change during the post-crisis years compared to pre-crisis years. This analysis aims to 
detect whether the relationships between financial and non-financial performances have different 
characteristics before and after the crisis. If this is the case, it suggests that the crisis played significant 
role in banks’ responsibility policies. Table 4 shows the estimation results. 
Table 4 provides comparisons of the relationships between financial performance proxies and 
CGVSCORE between pre and post-crisis years. The results are very interesting in relation to the overall 
results presented for total sample period in Table 2. In the financial performance equation, CGVSCORE 
has a negative impact on NIM and ESR, and positively influences TIER1, NPL, and CIR. However, the 
effects in the post-crisis period are opposite. The coefficients of the interaction variable 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE for NIM and ESR are positive and larger than the negative coefficients of the 
standalone variable of CGVSCORE. This indicates that the effects of banks’ governance on NIM and 
ESR are stronger in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. Further, the effects of 
governance on TIER1, NPL, and CIR are weaker during the post crisis period relative to the pre-crisis 
period, when the effects of governance were significant and positive. This makes sense, as banks with 
stronger governance require less capital, will have less risky loans and make fewer costs. In Table 1, we 
observed that there was a reduction in banks’ governance performance in the post-crisis period. The 
negative coefficients for the interactions in Table 5 indicate that banks with higher governance scores 
have lower TIER1, NPL and CIR. With respect to the financial performance equation, we find significant 
and positive effects for NIM, TIER1, NPL, ESR and a negative effect for CIR on the governance score 
during the pre-crisis period. These effects go in the opposite directions as is evidenced by the estimated 
coefficients of Post_Crisis*Financial Performance during the post-crisis period for all financial 
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performance proxies. This supports our H3 and suggests that the relevance of financial performance in 
explaining governance performance decreased in the post-crisis period. 
Table 4 reports comparisons of the relationships between financial performance proxies and 
ENVSCORE between pre- and post-crisis years. The results for the financial performance equations 
show that the effects of banks’ environmental performance on NIM, TIER1, NPL, and ESR are positive 
and those on CIR are negative during the pre-crisis period. However, the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction variables (Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE) with opposite signs in relation to the standalone variable 
of ENVSCORE indicate that the positive effects of NIM, TIER1, NPL, and ESR and the negative effects 
of CIR are weakened during the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. With respect to the 
environmental performance equation, ENVSCORE is affected by NIM and TIER1 (NPL, CIR, and ESR) 
positively (negatively) during the pre-crisis period, and those effects decrease in the post-crisis period 
compared to the pre-crisis years.  
Table 4 also provides the comparisons between pre- and post-crisis years of the relationships 
between financial performance and SOCSCORE. The results for the financial performance equation 
show that the effects of banks’ social responsibility on NIM and NPL (TIER1 and CIR) are positive 
(negative) during pre-crisis period. These effects are less positive (negative) during the post-crisis 
period compared to the pre-crisis one. Interestingly, we do not observe any significant effects of social 
performance on ESR in either the pre- or post-crisis period. Apart from ESR, the results for the 
SOCSCORE equation is very similar to the results we observe for ENVSCORE. Social performance is 
affected by NIM, TIER1 and ESR (NPL and CIR) significantly and positively (negatively) during the 
pre-crisis period, and these effects turn out to be exactly opposite during the post-crisis period relative 
to the pre-crisis.  
Thus, as to the role of the global financial crisis, we establish that differences in bank responsibility 
drive the changes in the ways in which financial and responsibility performance interact in the post-
crisis period. Banks’ responsibility fell in the wake of the crisis and has not reverted in the period studied 
afterwards. We also find that the finance-responsibility nexus weakened compared to the years before 
the global financial crisis. This could be the case because before the crisis, it was predominantly for 
strategic reasons that banks engaged with responsibility. After the crisis, regulators and supervisors 
pressed banks to improve their financial performance.  
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Table 4. 3SLS estimation for the effects of financial performance on responsibility scores with 
comparison between the post and pre-crisis periods in the banking industry. This table reports 3SLS 
estimations for simultaneous equation system of the relationship between responsibility scores and 
bank specific financial performance measures for the effect of crisis years with CGVSCORE, 
ENVSCORE, and SOCSCORE. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. Post_Crisis is a dummy 
variable taking one for years after 2009, and zero for years before 2008. All regressions control year 
fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are 
clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 















Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 0.938 *** 0.886 *** 1.003 *** 0.601 *** −0.027 
 [0.007] [0.018] [0.011] [0.021] [0.019] 
CGVSCORE −0.291 *** 23.535 *** 3.998 *** 0.377 *** −0.150 *** 
 [0.092] [3.317] [0.376] [0.067] [0.051] 
Post_Crisis −0.212 *** 13.943 *** 2.568 *** 0.210 *** −0.285 *** 
 [0.075] [2.304] [0.306] [0.046] [0.043] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 0.429 *** −23.119 *** −4.301 *** −0.363 *** 0.172 *** 
 [0.097] [3.296] [0.401] [0.064] [0.054] 
Size −0.015 −0.072 −0.051 0.010 *** −0.008 * 
 [0.010] [0.059] [0.033] [0.003] [0.005] 
LoanDeposit −0.041 −0.01 0.882 *** 0.072 *** −0.035 ** 
 [0.028] [0.205] [0.113] [0.011] [0.015] 
Pr.Crd.GDP 0.008 −0.038 −0.105 −0.079 *** −0.028 ** 
 [0.023] [0.149] [0.087] [0.010] [0.012] 
Constant 0.524 *** −11.301 *** −2.348 *** −0.253 *** 0.490 *** 
 [0.191] [2.384] [0.670] [0.064] [0.091] 
R-squared 0.935 0.663 0.855 0.621 0.108 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.023 *** 0.018 ** 0.069 *** −0.389 ** 8.391 *** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.155] [1.772] 
Post_Crisis 0.120 *** 0.256 ** 0.180 *** −0.168 ** 1.549 *** 
 [0.033] [0.127] [0.028] [0.069] [0.340] 
Post_Crisis*Financial Performance −0.016 ** −0.014 * −0.069 *** 0.450 *** −8.373 *** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.149] [1.772] 
Size 0.063 *** 0.060 *** 0.054 *** 0.053 *** 0.076 *** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] 
LoanDeposit −0.006 0.052 *** 0.01 0.009 −0.018 
 [0.011] [0.014] [0.012] [0.015] [0.060] 
Mean_SCORE 0.374 *** 0.236 *** 0.439 *** 0.280 *** 1.096 *** 
(Country/Year) [0.038] [0.048] [0.041] [0.047] [0.259] 
Mean_SCORE 0.643 *** 0.744 *** 0.696 *** 0.695 *** 0.504 ** 
(Country/Industry) [0.038] [0.047] [0.042] [0.049] [0.216] 
Constant −1.269 *** −1.442 *** −1.223 *** −0.802 *** −3.167 *** 
 [0.076] [0.163] [0.073] [0.084] [0.574] 
R-squared 0.664 0.652 0.608 0.58  
Observations 1840 1284 1808 1464 1966 
Environmental Score (ENVSCORE) 
















Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 0.934 *** 0.923 *** 0.976 *** 0.642 *** −0.021 
 [0.007] [0.074] [0.010] [0.023] [0.019] 
ENVSCORE 0.668 *** 149.302 *** 1.921 *** −0.386 *** 0.198 ** 
 [0.144] [29.514] [0.626] [0.055] [0.083] 
Post_Crisis 0.218 *** 88.030 *** 0.701 ** −0.142 *** −0.121 *** 
 [0.078] [18.122] [0.303] [0.030] [0.044] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE −0.540 *** −144.383 *** −1.187 ** 0.324 *** −0.171 ** 
 [0.123] [28.672] [0.527] [0.049] [0.071] 
Size −0.069 *** −1.800 *** −0.187 *** 0.038 *** −0.023 *** 
 [0.016] [0.459] [0.061] [0.005] [0.008] 
LoanDeposit −0.037 0.54 0.809 *** 0.062 *** −0.036 ** 
 [0.029] [0.830] [0.109] [0.011] [0.015] 
Pr.Crd.GDP 0.050 ** 0.984 0.094 −0.065 *** −0.019 
 [0.024] [0.608] [0.086] [0.009] [0.012] 
Constant 1.031 *** −59.110 *** 1.322 −0.381 *** 0.582 *** 
 [0.255] [14.383] [0.937] [0.083] [0.125] 
R-squared 0.93  0.864 0.563 0.083 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.031 *** 0.055 *** −0.019 ** −1.758 *** −2.290 * 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.226] [1.276] 
Post_Crisis 0.248 *** 0.719 *** 0.149 *** −0.555 *** −0.199 
 [0.041] [0.172] [0.033] [0.101] [0.230] 
Post_Crisis*Financial Performance −0.020 ** −0.046 *** 0.025 *** 1.679 *** 2.289 * 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.217] [1.278] 
Size 0.137 *** 0.147 *** 0.135 *** 0.136 *** 0.112 *** 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.010] 
LoanDeposit −0.011 0.019 −0.021 0.012 −0.022 
 [0.015] [0.020] [0.016] [0.025] [0.027] 
Mean_SCORE 0.102 ** 0.005 0.026 0.333 *** 0.168 
(Country/Year) [0.050] [0.057] [0.049] [0.074] [0.108] 
Mean_SCORE 0.709 *** 0.690 *** 0.669 *** 0.791 *** 0.795 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.030] [0.039] [0.031] [0.045] [0.062] 
Constant −2.600 *** −3.308 *** −2.388 *** −1.883 *** −1.727 *** 
 [0.101] [0.226] [0.088] [0.132] [0.343] 
R-squared 0.584 0.559 0.592 0.353 0.002 
Observations 1840 1284 1808 1464 1966 















Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 0.932 *** 0.878 *** 1.000 *** 0.654 *** −0.017 
 [0.007] [0.018] [0.012] [0.025] [0.019] 
SOCSCORE 0.310 ** −13.110 * 6.209 *** −0.594 *** 0.144 
 [0.153] [7.258] [0.682] [0.080] [0.088] 
Post_Crisis 0.135 −9.020 * 2.810 *** −0.288 *** −0.128 ** 
 [0.090] [4.602] [0.397] [0.045] [0.052] 
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Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE −0.246 * 13.302 * −4.949 *** 0.505 *** −0.116 
 [0.131] [7.036] [0.599] [0.071] [0.076] 
Size −0.040 *** 0.081 −0.395 *** 0.044 *** −0.019 ** 
 [0.015] [0.096] [0.059] [0.006] [0.007] 
LoanDeposit −0.041 0.354 * 0.548 *** 0.067 *** −0.040 ** 
 [0.029] [0.194] [0.129] [0.012] [0.016] 
Pr.Crd.GDP 0.025 0.153 0.337 *** −0.064 *** −0.022 * 
 [0.023] [0.145] [0.100] [0.009] [0.013] 
Constant 0.660 *** 8.513 ** 2.495 *** −0.340 *** 0.523 *** 
 [0.234] [3.585] [0.906] [0.082] [0.111] 
R-squared 0.934 0.737 0.819 0.491 0.084 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.042 *** 0.046 *** −0.031 *** −1.760 *** 4.009 ** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.209] [1.934] 
Post_Crisis 0.152 *** 0.588 *** 0.033 −0.669 *** 0.798 ** 
 [0.038] [0.147] [0.030] [0.093] [0.347] 
Post_Crisis*Financial Performance −0.022 ** −0.037 *** 0.036 *** 1.692 *** −4.000 ** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.200] [1.934] 
Size 0.119 *** 0.117 *** 0.109 *** 0.117 *** 0.115 *** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.012] 
LoanDeposit −0.01 0.038 ** −0.029 * 0.034 0.025 
 [0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.024] [0.037] 
Mean_SCORE 0.261 *** 0.157 *** 0.209 *** 0.318 *** 0.144 
(Country/Year) [0.048] [0.053] [0.048] [0.069] [0.119] 
Mean_SCORE 0.699 *** 0.751 *** 0.694 *** 0.800 *** 0.685 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.030] [0.035] [0.030] [0.049] [0.076] 
Constant −2.296 *** −2.779 *** −1.928 *** −1.494 *** −2.777 *** 
 [0.093] [0.191] [0.079] [0.123] [0.464] 
R-squared 0.587 0.515 0.598 0.294  
Observations 1840 1284 1808 1464 1966 
4.3. The Role of Economic and Institutional Development 
Hypothesis 4 tests whether and how economic development and institutions condition the 
finance—responsibility nexus and the role of the crisis therein. To this extent, we classify our sample 
countries along four different lines: 1. per capita income, 2. legal origin, 3. single versus multiple bank 
supervisors, and 4. central bank versus other agencies as banking supervisor (see Appendix B for the 
country groups). We report the results from the univariate comparisons in Appendix E, where we report 
mean values and two sets of comparisons for variables of banks’ responsibility and financial 
performances for: (1) the differences in mean values of variables between the pre- and post-crisis periods 
for two group of countries, and (2) the differences in mean values of variables between two group of 
countries for all sample period along with pre and post-crisis periods. First, we examine the 
comparisons for low and high-income countries. Banks’ governance is significantly improved in low-
income countries (Low) while both governance and social performance deteriorated in high income 
countries (High) during the post crisis period relative to pre-crisis period. In Low for all three periods, 
banks’ governance is significantly lower, even with improvement in governance, and environmental 
and social performance are significantly higher, except in pre-crisis period, than those in High. For 
banks’ financial performance variables, all have improved during the post-crisis relative to pre-crisis 
period in both Low, except excess stock return, and High. The NIM (TIER1) in Low is significantly lower 
(higher, but not significant) than that in High before the crisis, but higher (lower) afterwards. All other 
financial performance variables in Low are significantly higher than those in High. The exception is ESR 
during the post-crisis period, when there is no significant difference between two country groups. The 
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comparison regarding the legal origin of the countries where banks operate yields very interesting 
observations. Even though the governance and the environment scores of banks in civil law countries 
(Civil) increased after the crisis, and the governance and social score of banks in common law countries 
(Common) decreased, banks in Civil have significantly lower governance and higher environment and 
social performance (not significant before the crisis) than those in Common. All financial performance 
of banks in both Civil (except ESR) and Common improved during the post-crisis period from the levels 
in pre-crisis period. NIM and TIER1 (NPL and CIR) in Civil are significantly lower (higher), than those 
in Common. There was a significant difference in ESR in favor of banks in Civil before the crisis, but 
then it disappeared after the crisis. For the comparisons between countries with single and multiple 
supervisory authorities (Single vs. Multiple), we find that, after the crisis, banks experienced significant 
decrease with social scores in Single and with both governance and social scores in Multiple. 
Environment performance is significantly higher in Multiple during the post-crisis period relative pre-
crisis. However, banks’ governance is lower and environment and social scores are higher in all three 
periods for Single than those for Multiple. All financial performance of banks in both Single and 
Multiple (except ESR) improved during the post-crisis period from the levels in pre-crisis period. As in 
the comparisons between Civil and Common, NIM and TIER1 (NPL and CIR) in Single are significantly 
lower (higher), than those in Multiple. The significant difference in ESR before crisis in favor of banks 
in Single disappeared after the crisis. Banks experienced significant decrease with governance and 
environment scores and with governance only after the crisis in countries with supervision performed 
by outside of central bank (Non CB) and by central bank (CB), respectively. Environment performance 
is significantly higher in CB during the post-crisis period relative pre-crisis. Comparisons of Non CB 
and CB reveal that banks’ governance is significantly lower, and environment and social scores are 
significantly higher in all three periods, except post crisis, for Non CB than those for CB. In terms of 
financial performances, NIM and TIER1 (NPL and CIR) in Non CB are significantly lower (higher), than 
those in CB. There is a significant difference in ESR after the crisis in favor of Non CB.)  
Given the aim of this study, we are especially interested if and how income and institutional 
features of the country sample relate to our results regarding the finance—responsibility nexus. These 
factors turned out to be relevant in previous studies [18,23,24]. To find out if they also apply for the 
banking industry, we rely on the same model as used in the previous subsection but we now explicitly 
account for different types of development, i.e., per capita income (low versus high-income countries, 
Table 5, institutional development (civil law countries versus common law countries, Table 6, and the 
organization of bank supervision (countries with single bank supervisory authorities versus those with 
multiple ones, Table 7; countries with banking supervision conducted by the central bank versus those 
where agencies outside the central bank conduct this supervision, Table 8.  
Table 5 compares the finance-responsibility nexus along the governance, environment and social 
performance for low- and high-income countries (i.e., countries, which are in the bottom and top 40 
percentile of GDP per capita). We provide the comparison of the relationships between financial 
performance proxies and CGVSCORE between pre and post-crisis years. It shows that governance 
improves TIER1 for banks in both low and high-income countries during the pre-crisis period. It 
improves efficiency (CIR) for low-income country banks but not for high-income country ones. It 
reduces NPL in high-income country banks, but increases NPL for low-income country banks. Better 
financial performance in general improves governance, apart from NPL in low-income countries. 
Further, the crisis has had an important role, as there is a sign switch regarding the finance-
responsibility nexus. After the crisis (Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE), the impact of good governance on 
TIER1 decreases with banks in both low- and high-income countries relative to pre-crisis period. 
However, banks with relatively high governance scores reduce their NPL, but increase CIR in low-
income countries. The effects of governance on these two ratios decreases in high income countries. 
With respect to the effects of financial performance on governance, we observe that the effects are 
becoming smaller for all financial variables during the post-crisis period in low-income countries. 
However, we establish that TIER1 and ESR reduce governance for high-income countries banks. We 
also find that financial performance and environmental performance significantly interact regarding 
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most financial indicators. Here too, we find that the crisis had an impact and we detect some differences 
between banks in low and those in high-income countries: negative (positive) impact of ENVSCORE on 
NIM during the pre-crisis period decreases for low (high) income countries. The positive effect of 
environmental performance on TIER1 decreases during the post-crisis period in both groups of 
countries. The other difference between two types of countries is that the crisis mitigates the positive 
(negative) effect of NPL on environmental performance during the pre-crisis period. For the 
relationships between social and financial performance, it seems that the relationships are in general 
quite similar compared to environmental performance, apart for banks in low-income countries where 
they in general are weaker or absent. As such, we conclude that per capita income is relevant for the 
finance-responsibility nexus in relation to governance and social performance, but not with 
environmental performance.  
Table 6 compares the finance-responsibility nexus and the role of the crisis between civil law 
countries (Civil) and common law countries (Common). The differences between two groups of 
countries are as follows: during the pre-crisis period, CGVSCORE improves TIER1 and CIR for banks 
in Civil, but not for those in Common (CIR increases), and reduces NIM for banks in Common, but has 
no effects on banks in Civil. The effects of financial performance are similar, apart for TIER, which 
reduces (increases) governance in Civil (Common). When we examine the effects during the post-crisis 
period, (Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE), we observe smaller effects of CGVSCORE on CIR with the opposite 
direction in civil and common law countries. The impact of good governance on TIER1 decreases with 
banks in Civil only; on NIM it increases in both Civil and Common. With respect to the effects of 
financial performance on governance after the crisis, the major difference in both groups of countries is 
that TIER1 improves governance in Civil but worsens it in Common. There is a negative (positive) 
impact of ENVSCORE on NIM during the pre-crisis period for banks in Civil (Common), and these 
opposite impacts become less during the post-crisis period in both groups. The positive effect of 
environmental performance on TIER1 decreases during the post-crisis period in both groups of 
countries. The other difference between the two types of countries is that the crisis mitigates the positive 
effect of NPL on environmental performance in civil law countries. More importantly, we observe 
simultaneous significant effects between financial performance and ENVSCORE for both the pre and 
post-crisis period specifically for banks in common law countries. For the relationships between social 
and financial performance, we find that there is no effect of financial performance on SOCSCORE, 
except a marginal effect for ESR, both before and after the crisis with banks in Civil. Social performance 
does influence finance though, with the crisis having a mitigating effect. In Common, we witness two-
way interaction next to a significant crisis effect. Better financial performance, except with NIM, in the 
post-crisis period also changes the effects on social performance opposite to the effects during pre-crisis 
period. In all, it shows that the division of our sample along Common and Civil is relevant as the two 
have a different finance-performance nexus and the financial crisis did have a different impact. These 
results confirm the findings of [23,24], who both suggested such differences. However, as we use more 
detailed finance and responsibility indicators, we have expanded their original insights. Further, we 
show that there is support for the probing hypothesis about a different finance-responsibility nexus in 
relation to the legal system. 
Table 7 investigates whether the organization of banking supervision matters for the finance-
responsibility nexus in the banking industry in relation to the global financial crisis [18]. We first 
compare countries with a single bank supervisory authority (Single) with those having multiple 
supervisory authorities (Multiple). Regarding governance, we find that in Single, governance 
significantly influences TIER1, but that better capitalized banks do not have better governance. When 
there are multiple bank supervisors, better governance does not affect TIER1, but banks with more 
capital have better governance. We also find a different effect of the crisis: for banks in Single, the crisis 
did change how governance influences TIER1 but it did not affect the role of governance in relation to 
capital adequacy. For banks in Multiple, the crisis did not affect the lack of impact of governance on 
capital but did so regarding how capital adequacy affects governance. For environmental and social 
performance, we witness asymmetries between two the types of supervision, in particular the effects of 
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responsibility on NIM, the effects of TIER1 on responsibility, and opposite relationships between 
responsibility and NPL. In general, the division of banks along single or multiple supervision seems to 
play a moderate role regarding the finance-responsibility nexus for NIM, TIER1 and NPL and the role 
of the financial crisis.  
Table 8 shows the comparison of the nexus in relation to the crisis in countries with bank 
supervision conducted by agencies outside the central bank (Non CB) and in those where the central 
bank acts as the banking supervisor (CB). With banks’ governance, the major difference between the 
two sets of countries is the relationship between CGVSCORE and TIER1. The impact of governance on 
TIER1 and the reverse impact are totally opposite for the two groups. While the relationship is negative 
for Non CB and positive for CB before the crisis, those effects become smaller after the crisis. The other 
difference is that the relationship between CIR and governance is insignificant for banks in Non CB, but 
the impact of governance is important in both pre and post crisis periods in CB. For environmental and 
social performance , it shows that for banks in CB the impact of financial performance on environmental 
and social performances are more pronounced before and after the crisis than for banks in Non CB, with 
ESR being the exception (the relationships between ESR and responsibility are also significant in Non 
CB). In all, there is evidence to conclude that there are differences in the finance-responsibility nexus for 
banks supervised by either the central bank or by agencies outside the central bank. 
In all, Tables 5-8 reveal that changes in responsibility policies of the banks are behind the changes 
in the ways in which financial and responsibility performance interact in the post-crisis period. In turn, 
these seem to be conditioned by economic development, legal origin and organization of bank 
regulation and supervision. In general, we observe that the crisis weakened the finance-responsibility 
nexus. This could be the case because before the crisis, it was predominantly for strategic reasons that 
banks engaged with responsibility. After the crisis, regulators and supervisors pressed banks to 
improve their financial performance, which seems to have affected their investments in CSR. As 
mentioned before, there is no grounding theoretical framework at this stage, which offers an 
encompassing explanation for the findings of our exploratory analysis and we leave this for further 
research.  
Table 5. 3SLS estimations for the role of economic development with comparison between the post 
and pre-crisis periods in the banking industry. This table reports 3SLS estimations for simultaneous 
equation system of the relationship between responsibility scores and bank specific financial performance 
measures for the effect of crisis years with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and SOCSCORE. Low and High 
income countries are determined by the bottom and top 40 percentile of GDP per Capita by year. The 
definitions of variables are in Appendix A. All regressions control year fixed effects. The sample period 
is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Low Income Countries 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.909 *** 0.991 *** 0.987 *** 0.695 *** −0.022 
 [0.010] [0.062] [0.017] [0.035] [0.028] 
CGVSCORE 0.454 120.180 *** 6.106 *** −0.544 *** 0.12 
 [0.358] [16.958] [1.763] [0.120] [0.200] 
Post_Crisis −0.006 45.130 *** 2.989 *** −0.263 *** −0.216 ** 
 [0.150] [7.508] [0.778] [0.075] [0.096] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE −0.255 −118.805 *** −6.830 *** 0.507 *** −0.049 
 [0.345] [16.911] [1.708] [0.118] [0.192] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
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Financial Performance 0.055 *** 0.056 *** 0.143 *** −8.659 *** 14.530 *** 
 [0.018] [0.017] [0.022] [1.449] [5.093] 
Post_Crisis 0.365 *** 1.279 *** 0.494 *** −4.103 *** 2.886 *** 
 [0.072] [0.370] [0.065] [0.749] [1.001] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.051 *** −0.049 *** −0.144 *** 8.581 *** 
−14.535 
*** 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.022] [1.446] [5.098] 
Observations 843 623 808 662 889 
High Income Countries 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.960 *** 0.899 *** 0.960 *** 0.439 *** −0.108 *** 
 [0.014] [0.044] [0.019] [0.039] [0.034] 
CGVSCORE −0.065 61.871 *** −3.256 ** 0.702 *** −0.374 ** 
 [0.322] [15.068] [1.287] [0.179] [0.146] 
Post_Crisis 0.007 52.726 *** −1.834 ** 0.419 *** −0.319 *** 
 [0.233] [13.101] [0.883] [0.124] [0.107] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 0.071 −61.396 *** 2.632 ** −0.689 *** 0.387 *** 
 [0.316] [14.973] [1.227] [0.173] [0.144] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.006 0.077 *** −0.510 *** −0.283 7.183 *** 
 [0.014] [0.020] [0.107] [0.269] [2.695] 
Post_Crisis −0.021 0.538 ** −0.418 *** −0.176 * 0.660 ** 
 [0.057] [0.220] [0.091] [0.101] [0.300] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.008 −0.073 *** 0.507 *** 0.323 −7.258 *** 
 [0.014] [0.020] [0.107] [0.249] [2.718] 
Observations 634 443 647 639 675 
Low Income Countries 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.932 *** 0.987 *** 0.983 *** 0.680 *** −0.019 
 [0.013] [0.102] [0.016] [0.036] [0.028] 
ENVSCORE −2.095 *** 217.732 *** 1.38 −0.558 *** 0.266 
 [0.442] [47.081] [1.697] [0.121] [0.197] 
Post_Crisis −1.097 *** 143.826 *** 1.196 −0.393 *** −0.085 
 [0.262] [32.147] [0.963] [0.099] [0.125] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE 1.958 *** −215.593 *** −1.136 0.516 *** −0.249 
 [0.414] [46.724] [1.583] [0.117] [0.186] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.023 0.036 * 0.046 * −5.359 *** 8.712 *** 
 [0.023] [0.021] [0.024] [1.282] [3.372] 
Post_Crisis 0.284 *** 0.752 0.311 *** −2.454 *** 1.810 *** 
 [0.088] [0.459] [0.071] [0.669] [0.637] 




−0.018 −0.028 −0.043 * 5.233 *** −8.694 *** 
 [0.024] [0.021] [0.024] [1.279] [3.370] 
Observations 843 623 808 662 889 
High Income Countries 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 1.011 *** 0.811 *** 0.884 *** 0.551 *** −0.096 *** 
 [0.023] [0.139] [0.031] [0.063] [0.034] 
ENVSCORE 2.940 *** 136.647 *** −9.208 *** −1.157 *** −0.101 
 [0.481] [41.337] [2.050] [0.230] [0.201] 
Post_Crisis 0.305 ** 45.062 *** −0.737 * −0.138 ** −0.068 
 [0.148] [16.203] [0.402] [0.055] [0.046] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE −1.852 *** −122.264 *** 6.354 *** 0.754 *** 0.081 
 [0.318] [37.445] [1.364] [0.155] [0.129] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance −0.01 0.187 *** −0.684 *** −1.386 *** 1.611 * 
 [0.015] [0.032] [0.117] [0.324] [0.830] 
Post_Crisis 0.143 ** 1.875 *** −0.398 *** −0.365 *** 0.322 *** 
 [0.063] [0.352] [0.107] [0.127] [0.100] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
0 −0.176 *** 0.688 *** 1.284 *** −1.621 * 
 [0.015] [0.032] [0.117] [0.295] [0.830] 
Observations 634 443 647 639 675 
Low Income Countries 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 0.919 *** 1.174 ** 0.985 *** 0.704 *** −0.015 
 [0.011] [0.545] [0.016] [0.063] [0.029] 
SOCSCORE −0.940 * −554.809 1.334 −1.755 *** 0.34 
 [0.494] [736.447] [1.999] [0.345] [0.266] 
Post_Crisis −0.594 * −456.096 1.446 −1.257 *** 0.007 
 [0.315] [601.733] [1.255] [0.266] [0.184] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE 0.860 * 550.038 −1.31 1.634 *** −0.339 
 [0.457] [729.201] [1.869] [0.330] [0.249] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.016 0.037 * 0.026 −3.072 *** 11.902 ** 
 [0.021] [0.019] [0.022] [1.004] [4.839] 
Post_Crisis 0.173 ** 0.578 0.200 *** −1.363 ** 2.320 ** 
 [0.081] [0.408] [0.064] [0.529] [0.929] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.002 −0.025 −0.021 2.888 *** −11.904 ** 
 [0.022] [0.019] [0.022] [1.005] [4.838] 
Observations 843 623 808 662 889 
High Income Countries 
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Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.984 *** 0.814 *** 0.853 *** 0.504 *** −0.100 *** 
 [0.019] [0.152] [0.037] [0.050] [0.035] 
SOCSCORE 2.172 *** 163.573 *** −11.941 *** −0.848 *** 0.05 
 [0.420] [52.539] [2.134] [0.187] [0.178] 
Post_Crisis 0.564 *** 43.195 ** −2.271 *** −0.257 *** −0.091 
 [0.160] [16.818] [0.646] [0.064] [0.061] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE −1.421 *** −146.049 *** 7.418 *** 0.547 *** 0.074 
 [0.299] [47.525] [1.490] [0.134] [0.123] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.003 0.142 *** −0.500 *** −1.383 *** 0.593 
 [0.013] [0.025] [0.096] [0.276] [0.473] 
Post_Crisis 0.028 1.442 *** −0.371 *** −0.494 *** 0.078 
 [0.058] [0.277] [0.090] [0.108] [0.059] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.005 −0.130 *** 0.496 *** 1.215 *** −0.564 
 [0.014] [0.025] [0.096] [0.256] [0.474] 
Observations 634 443 647 639 675 
Table 6. 3SLS estimation for the role of legal origin with comparison between the post and pre-crisis 
periods in the banking industry. This table reports 3SLS estimations for simultaneous equation system 
of the relationship between responsibility scores and bank specific financial performance measures for 
the effect of crisis years with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and SOCSCORE. The definitions of variables are 
in Appendix A. All regressions control year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust 
standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Civil Law Countries 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 0.896 *** 0.856 *** 1.022 *** 0.497 *** 0.019 
 [0.010] [0.033] [0.017] [0.043] [0.027] 
CGVSCORE −0.313 111.699 *** 7.172 *** −0.843 *** −0.061 
 [0.198] [33.893] [1.276] [0.251] [0.136] 
Post_Crisis −0.066 1.786 1.905 *** −0.385 *** −0.421 *** 
 [0.094] [3.745] [0.537] [0.090] [0.065] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 0.337 * −110.130 *** −6.395 *** 0.774 *** 0.079 
 [0.179] [33.662] [1.147] [0.240] [0.122] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.025 ** −0.032 * 0.069 *** −2.351 *** 12.668 ** 
 [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.506] [6.409] 
Post_Crisis 0.198 *** −0.939 0.417 *** −1.415 *** 4.667 ** 
 [0.044] [0.618] [0.054] [0.365] [2.297] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.014 0.037 ** −0.069 *** 2.289 *** −12.637 
** 
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 [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.496] [6.403] 
Observations 939 669 584 589 1004 
Common Law Countries 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.970 *** 1.061 *** 0.936 *** 0.666 *** −0.081 *** 
 [0.011] [0.259] [0.015] [0.027] [0.028] 
CGVSCORE −1.143 *** −464.702 5.895 *** 0.413 *** 0.159 
 [0.381] [308.408] [1.076] [0.111] [0.178] 
Post_Crisis −0.697 *** −346.834 3.929 *** 0.283 *** 0.014 
 [0.251] [230.590] [0.722] [0.077] [0.118] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 1.079 *** 454.273 −5.448 *** −0.369 *** −0.125 
 [0.348] [301.388] [0.996] [0.104] [0.163] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.030 ** 0.101 *** 0.078 ** −0.601 *** 6.096 *** 
 [0.013] [0.027] [0.031] [0.164] [2.344] 
Post_Crisis 0.084 0.784 *** 0.062 −0.274 *** 0.476 ** 
 [0.052] [0.242] [0.041] [0.066] [0.208] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.028 ** −0.097 *** −0.078 ** 0.661 *** −6.081 *** 
 [0.013] [0.027] [0.031] [0.157] [2.341] 
Observations 887 644 912 858 945 
Civil Law Countries 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 0.892 *** 1.029 *** 1.007 *** 0.508 *** 0.019 
 [0.010] [0.110] [0.024] [0.046] [0.027] 
ENVSCORE −0.734 *** 200.884 *** 15.784 *** −0.893 *** −0.019 
 [0.246] [47.634] [2.639] [0.222] [0.165] 
Post_Crisis −0.250 * 91.096 *** 6.030 *** −0.587 *** −0.402 *** 
 [0.134] [24.769] [1.174] [0.123] [0.089] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE 0.609 *** −198.174 *** −13.210 *** 0.847 *** 0.013 
 [0.219] [47.124] [2.286] [0.216] [0.147] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.026 * 0.012 0.017 −0.784 5.972 
 [0.016] [0.026] [0.013] [0.494] [3.910] 
Post_Crisis 0.310 *** 0.316 0.309 *** −0.293 2.388 * 
 [0.058] [0.870] [0.065] [0.351] [1.374] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.02 −0.003 −0.012 0.836 * −5.959 
 [0.016] [0.026] [0.014] [0.489] [3.905] 
Observations 939 624 879 589 1004 
Common Law Countries 
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Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.968 *** 0.830 *** 0.921 *** 0.702 *** −0.081 *** 
 [0.012] [0.078] [0.012] [0.026] [0.027] 
ENVSCORE 0.998 *** 84.366 *** −0.143 −0.144 *** 0.122 * 
 [0.160] [21.647] [0.368] [0.042] [0.073] 
Post_Crisis 0.266 *** 51.270 *** −0.095 −0.019 −0.057 
 [0.095] [13.662] [0.207] [0.024] [0.042] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE −0.704 *** −79.880 *** 0.453 0.119 *** −0.069 
 [0.136] [20.668] [0.311] [0.035] [0.062] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.019 0.279 *** −0.079 ** −1.398 *** 2.956 
 [0.015] [0.046] [0.034] [0.237] [1.844] 
Post_Crisis 0.177 *** 2.361 *** 0.090 ** −0.316 *** 0.397 *** 
 [0.064] [0.417] [0.045] [0.092] [0.148] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.004 −0.266 *** 0.086 ** 1.337 *** −2.941 
 [0.016] [0.045] [0.034] [0.226] [1.843] 
Observations 887 644 912 858 945 
Civil Law Countries 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.894 *** 0.864 *** 1.031 *** 0.579 *** 0.02 
 [0.010] [0.046] [0.022] [0.064] [0.027] 
SOCSCORE −0.502 ** 72.424 *** 12.701 *** −1.700 *** −0.011 
 [0.226] [22.266] [1.633] [0.362] [0.152] 
Post_Crisis −0.189 53.984 *** 5.696 *** −1.291 *** −0.413 *** 
 [0.139] [18.805] [0.959] [0.254] [0.095] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE 0.373 * −70.704 *** −9.926 *** 1.598 *** 0.024 
 [0.191] [21.898] [1.390] [0.345] [0.127] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.009 0.001 0.014 −0.328 8.684 * 
 [0.014] [0.022] [0.012] [0.410] [4.839] 
Post_Crisis 0.132 ** −0.202 0.191 *** −0.199 3.180 * 
 [0.054] [0.749] [0.060] [0.288] [1.698] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
0.01 0.004 −0.008 0.368 −8.647 * 
 [0.014] [0.022] [0.013] [0.405] [4.830] 
Observations 939 669 584 589 1004 
Common Law Countries 












Financial Performance Equation 




0.963 *** 0.803 *** 0.928 *** 0.702 *** −0.079 *** 
 [0.012] [0.096] [0.012] [0.026] [0.028] 
SOCSCORE 1.324 *** 117.542 *** −0.456 −0.184 *** 0.105 
 [0.223] [36.447] [0.480] [0.057] [0.098] 
Post_Crisis 0.499 *** 64.264 *** 0.048 −0.056 * −0.048 
 [0.122] [20.470] [0.264] [0.031] [0.053] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE −0.982 *** −111.216 *** 0.177 0.160 *** −0.06 
 [0.191] [34.760] [0.413] [0.048] [0.083] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.039 *** 0.234 *** −0.129 *** −1.453 *** 2.906 * 
 [0.014] [0.039] [0.031] [0.219] [1.616] 
Post_Crisis 0.144 ** 2.006 *** −0.038 −0.447 *** 0.300 ** 
 [0.059] [0.352] [0.041] [0.085] [0.134] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.023 −0.222 *** 0.130 *** 1.370 *** −2.900 * 
 [0.015] [0.038] [0.031] [0.206] [1.614] 
Observations 887 644 912 858 945 
Table 7. 3SLS estimation for the role of the number of supervisory authorities on banks with 
comparison between the post and pre-crisis periods in the banking industry. This table reports 3SLS 
estimations for simultaneous equation system of the relationship between responsibility scores and bank 
specific financial performance measures for the effect of crisis years with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and 
SOCSCORE. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. All regressions control year fixed effects. 
The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at 
the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Countries with Single Bank Supervisory Authorities 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 0.920 *** 0.875 *** 0.999 *** 0.602 *** 0.005 
 [0.008] [0.022] [0.012] [0.026] [0.022] 
CGVSCORE −0.085 34.518 *** 3.257 *** −0.076 −0.083 
 [0.108] [5.904] [0.540] [0.073] [0.067] 
Post_Crisis −0.165 ** 14.770 *** 1.958 *** −0.144 *** −0.326 *** 
 [0.084] [3.071] [0.405] [0.052] [0.054] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 0.260 ** −33.863 *** −3.531 *** 0.082 0.121 * 
 [0.111] [5.875] [0.555] [0.070] [0.069] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.029 ** 0.003 0.087 *** −2.824 *** 11.003 *** 
 [0.011] [0.008] [0.009] [0.471] [3.409] 
Post_Crisis 0.216 *** 0.243 0.384 *** −1.402 *** 2.639 *** 
 [0.042] [0.167] [0.041] [0.268] [0.800] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.019 * 0 −0.088 *** 2.764 *** −10.989 *** 
 [0.011] [0.008] [0.010] [0.465] [3.412] 
Observations 1294 892 1263 915 1389 
Countries with multiple bank supervisory authorities 
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Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.960 *** 0.887 *** 0.830 *** 0.436 *** −0.097 *** 
 [0.016] [0.030] [0.024] [0.039] [0.036] 
CGVSCORE 0.05 10.335 2.955 *** 0.297 *** −0.448 *** 
 [0.250] [7.376] [0.604] [0.097] [0.111] 
Post_Crisis 0.11 8.633 2.372 *** 0.163 ** −0.400 *** 
 [0.189] [6.463] [0.441] [0.070] [0.084] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE −0.027 −10.476 −3.198 *** −0.282 *** 0.437 *** 
 [0.251] [7.317] [0.595] [0.095] [0.112] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance −0.015 0.236 *** −0.03 0.948 *** 2.437 *** 
 [0.014] [0.057] [0.036] [0.302] [0.789] 
Post_Crisis −0.04 1.843 *** −0.07 0.243 ** 0.315 ** 
 [0.056] [0.517] [0.049] [0.107] [0.126] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
0.004 −0.227 *** 0.03 −0.746 *** −2.475 *** 
 [0.014] [0.056] [0.035] [0.278] [0.798] 
Observations 546 392 545 549 577 
Countries with single bank supervisory authorities 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.920 *** 1.030 *** 0.992 *** 0.616 *** 0.008 
 [0.008] [0.067] [0.014] [0.030] [0.022] 
ENVSCORE −0.121 130.631 *** 7.339 *** −0.447 *** 0.107 
 [0.186] [20.048] [1.032] [0.103] [0.119] 
Post_Crisis −0.134 93.093 *** 3.924 *** −0.368 *** −0.218 *** 
 [0.120] [14.997] [0.655] [0.074] [0.078] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE 0.142 −128.206 *** −6.106 *** 0.394 *** −0.088 
 [0.165] [19.765] [0.923] [0.095] [0.106] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.045 *** 0.015 0.033 *** −2.265 *** 43.931 
 [0.015] [0.011] [0.011] [0.471] [39.866] 
Post_Crisis 0.293 *** 0.237 0.273 *** −1.069 *** 9.908 
 [0.053] [0.221] [0.048] [0.270] [8.825] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.033 ** −0.009 −0.028 ** 2.227 *** −43.876 
 [0.015] [0.011] [0.012] [0.467] [39.824] 
Observations 1294 892 1263 915 1389 
Countries with multiple bank supervisory authorities 












Financial Performance Equation 




1.037 *** 0.625 *** 0.816 *** 0.595 *** −0.124 ** 
 [0.036] [0.203] [0.027] [0.091] [0.060] 
ENVSCORE 5.535 *** 141.312 ** −3.560 ** −1.018 ** 1.864 *** 
 [1.125] [59.030] [1.546] [0.505] [0.654] 
Post_Crisis 0.671 *** 45.590 ** −0.243 −0.106 * 0.052 
 [0.240] [21.464] [0.248] [0.063] [0.092] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE −3.907 *** −124.851 ** 2.731 ** 0.731 * −1.283 *** 
 [0.806] [52.640] [1.107] [0.377] [0.459] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.012 0.426 *** −0.222 *** −1.343 *** 36.834 
 [0.017] [0.089] [0.035] [0.296] [67.868] 
Post_Crisis 0.262 *** 3.795 *** −0.056 −0.318 *** 5.49 
 [0.068] [0.831] [0.055] [0.113] [9.797] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.024 −0.400 *** 0.223 *** 1.337 *** −37.129 
 [0.017] [0.086] [0.034] [0.273] [68.471] 
Observations 546 392 545 549 577 
Countries with single bank supervisory authorities 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.918 *** 0.849 *** 1.015 *** 0.662 *** 0.009 
 [0.008] [0.031] [0.015] [0.038] [0.022] 
SOCSCORE −0.028 53.086 *** 7.654 *** −0.997 *** 0.047 
 [0.167] [13.120] [0.847] [0.151] [0.102] 
Post_Crisis −0.09 42.175 *** 4.776 *** −0.795 *** −0.257 *** 
 [0.123] [10.907] [0.641] [0.119] [0.078] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE 0.061 −51.896 *** −6.647 *** 0.891 *** −0.019 
 [0.149] [12.932] [0.784] [0.141] [0.092] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.026 * 0.009 0.024 ** −1.171 *** 25.470 * 
 [0.014] [0.010] [0.011] [0.385] [14.188] 
Post_Crisis 0.148 *** 0.111 0.191 *** −0.511 ** 5.846 * 
 [0.049] [0.198] [0.045] [0.222] [3.217] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.003 −0.004 −0.020 * 1.039 *** −25.434 * 
 [0.014] [0.010] [0.011] [0.382] [14.177] 
Observations 1294 892 1263 915 1389 
Countries with multiple bank supervisory authorities 












Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 1.019 *** 0.546 * 0.796 *** 0.502 *** −0.052 
 [0.033] [0.285] [0.051] [0.054] [0.046] 
SOCSCORE 4.898 *** 182.146 −10.864 *** −0.578 0.938 ** 
 [1.092] [111.821] [2.612] [0.363] [0.427] 
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Post_Crisis 1.221 *** 46.878 −2.109 *** −0.153 0.1 
 [0.322] [31.299] [0.705] [0.097] [0.112] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE −3.272 *** −160.523 7.141 *** 0.371 −0.603 ** 
 [0.756] [99.460] [1.830] [0.264] [0.289] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.01 0.361 *** −0.131 *** −1.174 *** 3.916 
 [0.014] [0.073] [0.029] [0.241] [3.167] 
Post_Crisis 0.089 3.210 *** −0.080 * −0.393 *** 0.579 
 [0.060] [0.681] [0.047] [0.090] [0.445] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.018 −0.337 *** 0.123 *** 1.133 *** −3.9 
 [0.014] [0.071] [0.029] [0.227] [3.190] 
Observations 546 392 545 549 577 
Table 8. 3SLS estimation for the role of provider of banking supervision with comparison between 
the post and pre-crisis periods in the banking industry. This table reports 3SLS estimations for 
simultaneous equation system of the relationship between responsibility scores and bank specific 
financial performance measures for the effect of crisis years with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and 
SOCSCORE. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. All regressions control year fixed effects. 
The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at 
the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Countries with Banking Supervision Conducted by Agencies Outside of the Central Bank 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.939 *** 0.960 *** 0.909 *** 0.461 *** −0.017 
 [0.011] [0.036] [0.016] [0.037] [0.031] 
CGVSCORE −0.161 * −49.606 *** 1.735 *** 0.052 −0.128 * 
 [0.086] [9.280] [0.290] [0.090] [0.068] 
Post_Crisis −0.181 ** −31.736 *** 1.231 *** −0.122 * −0.386 *** 
 [0.083] [6.541] [0.261] [0.068] [0.064] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 0.263 *** 49.653 *** −1.671 *** 0.002 0.166 ** 
 [0.092] [9.291] [0.300] [0.092] [0.073] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.016 −0.036 *** 0.030 *** 0.483 4.393 *** 
 [0.017] [0.013] [0.008] [0.350] [1.314] 
Post_Crisis 0.168 *** −0.152 0.225 *** 0.355 1.330 *** 
 [0.051] [0.152] [0.042] [0.216] [0.378] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.011 0.039 *** −0.028 *** −0.389 
−4.361 
*** 
 [0.017] [0.013] [0.008] [0.350] [1.317] 
Observations 710 459 660 507 769 
Countries with banking supervision conducted by the central bank 











Financial Performance Equation 




0.935 *** 1.051 *** 0.971 *** 0.627 *** −0.035 
 [0.009] [0.056] [0.018] [0.028] [0.023] 
CGVSCORE −0.553 ** 104.167 *** 12.286 *** 0.518 *** −0.129 
 [0.259] [12.547] [1.505] [0.097] [0.127] 
Post_Crisis −0.302 ** 59.073 *** 6.715 *** 0.346 *** −0.236 
*** 
 [0.143] [7.970] [0.845] [0.063] [0.074] 
Post_Crisis*CGVSCORE 0.638 *** −101.037 *** −11.577 *** −0.492 *** 0.187 * 
 [0.226] [12.274] [1.333] [0.087] [0.111] 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.037 *** 0.060 *** 0.094 *** 0.239 9.536 *** 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.018] [0.413] [2.666] 
Post_Crisis 0.144 *** 0.936 *** 0.134 *** 0.019 1.218 *** 
 [0.048] [0.223] [0.039] [0.136] [0.371] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.031 *** −0.054 *** −0.092 *** −0.153 −9.532 
*** 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.018] [0.410] [2.666] 
Observations 1130 825 1148 957 1197 
Countries with banking supervision conducted by agencies outside of the central bank 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 0.933 *** 1.034 *** 0.942 *** 0.469 *** −0.01 
 [0.011] [0.100] [0.023] [0.043] [0.031] 
ENVSCORE 0.095 147.225 *** 5.913 *** −0.549 *** 0.001 
 [0.163] [35.691] [0.757] [0.161] [0.137] 
Post_Crisis 0.012 125.616 *** 3.400 *** −0.454 *** −0.313 
*** 
 [0.110] [30.650] [0.505] [0.107] [0.090] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE −0.119 −144.680 *** −4.857 *** 0.487 *** 0.005 
 [0.139] [35.205] [0.648] [0.145] [0.119] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.032 0.005 −0.003 0.568 9.038 ** 
 [0.024] [0.019] [0.011] [0.458] [4.550] 
Post_Crisis 0.216 *** −0.069 0.156 *** 0.445 2.587 ** 
 [0.072] [0.219] [0.059] [0.278] [1.231] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.016 0.005 0.013 −0.481 −9.006 ** 
 [0.024] [0.019] [0.011] [0.453] [4.545] 
Observations 710 459 660 507 769 
Countries with banking supervision conducted by the central bank 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 0.930 *** 0.816 *** 0.974 *** 0.674 *** −0.031 
 [0.009] [0.076] [0.015] [0.030] [0.024] 
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ENVSCORE 0.832 *** 122.434 *** −5.351 *** −0.550 *** 0.244 ** 
 [0.237] [36.850] [1.234] [0.097] [0.116] 
Post_Crisis 0.250 ** 50.955 *** −1.322 *** −0.103 *** −0.061 
 [0.108] [16.645] [0.457] [0.037] [0.050] 
Post_Crisis*ENVSCORE −0.677 *** −118.585 *** 5.038 *** 0.502 *** −0.213 ** 
 [0.207] [35.895] [1.064] [0.088] [0.100] 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.031 ** 0.085 *** −0.097 *** −1.311 ** −2.794 
*** 
 [0.013] [0.014] [0.018] [0.523] [0.891] 
Post_Crisis 0.273 *** 1.469 *** 0.076 * −0.286 * −0.164 
 [0.056] [0.270] [0.043] [0.173] [0.132] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance −0.025 * −0.075 *** 0.101 *** 1.308 ** 2.789 *** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.523] [0.894] 
Observations 1130 825 1148 957 1197 
Countries with banking supervision conducted by agencies outside of the central bank 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.934 *** 0.966 *** 0.962 *** 0.508 *** −0.014 
 [0.011] [0.071] [0.021] [0.046] [0.031] 
SOCSCORE −0.033 102.941 *** 4.421 *** −0.845 *** −0.062 
 [0.141] [26.383] [0.471] [0.186] [0.108] 
Post_Crisis −0.077 85.424 *** 2.981 *** −0.720 *** −0.382 *** 
 [0.109] [21.976] [0.394] [0.144] [0.084] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE 0.02 −101.107 *** −3.569 *** 0.735 *** 0.105 
 [0.118] [26.055] [0.418] [0.171] [0.093] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.018 −0.01 −0.021 ** 0.317 5.950 *** 
 [0.021] [0.016] [0.009] [0.363] [2.287] 
Post_Crisis 0.081 −0.049 0.032 0.209 1.763 *** 
 [0.064] [0.188] [0.053] [0.221] [0.655] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 0.005 0.014 0.030 *** −0.286 −5.856 ** 
 [0.021] [0.016] [0.010] [0.359] [2.280] 
Observations 710 459 660 507 769 
Countries with banking supervision conducted by the central bank 











Financial Performance Equation 
Financial 
Performance_lag1 
0.926 *** 1.076 *** 0.978 *** 0.672 *** −0.023 
 [0.009] [0.084] [0.014] [0.029] [0.025] 
SOCSCORE 1.184 *** −118.673 *** −4.433 *** −0.487 *** 0.303 * 
 [0.320] [25.546] [1.473] [0.149] [0.164] 
Post_Crisis 0.481 *** −61.492 *** −1.484 ** −0.159 *** −0.005 
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 [0.152] [13.344] [0.630] [0.060] [0.075] 
Post_Crisis*SOCSCORE −0.986 *** 116.831 *** 4.017 *** 0.464 *** −0.269 * 
 [0.277] [24.999] [1.279] [0.135] [0.141] 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.046 *** 0.084 *** −0.114 *** −1.308 *** −3.233 *** 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.493] [0.912] 
Post_Crisis 0.186 *** 1.360 *** −0.048 −0.398 ** −0.350 ** 
 [0.052] [0.235] [0.040] [0.163] [0.137] 
Post_Crisis*Financial 
Performance 
−0.030 ** −0.072 *** 0.118 *** 1.348 *** 3.210 *** 
 [0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.493] [0.913] 
Observations 1130 825 1148 957 1197 
5. Conclusions  
Banks are special: they are intermediaries and both sides of their balance sheet consist of financial 
assets that are used as money. As a result, they are highly regulated. We study if, how and why banks’ 
financial performance relates to their responsibility. We zoom in on the finance—responsibility nexus 
based on detailed bank-specific financial performance indicators used by their regulatory and 
supervisory authorities. Relying on a large international sample for the 2002–2015 period, we model the 
financial performance—responsibility nexus and estimate this with the help of a wide array of 
indicators.  
We find that in several cases there is a significant association between bank performance and 
responsibility. In particular, banks’ capital adequacy is driving their responsibility and, therefore, 
responsibility signals bank health. As such, responsibility has an important reputational effect. We also 
establish that financial performance most of the time positively affects banks’ responsibility, and not the 
other way around. This implies that especially the available funds hypothesis seems to hold (see [49,50]). 
This hypothesis argues that investment in responsibility is costly and that better performing firms will 
make more expenses in environmentally and socially advantageous activities. After the financial crisis, 
the finance-responsibility nexus did significantly change and the interaction between the two types of 
performance weakened. We find that the institutional setting of the banks can play an important role as 
we detect differences in the finance-responsibility nexus—and in relation to the global financial crisis—
between banks operating in civil versus common law countries and between those supervised by a 
single bank authority and those supervised by multiple agencies.  
Our findings support those of [2,8,45] about the specific position of banks compared to other 
industries in relation to responsibility. The results of our study align with those in [15] regarding the 
increase in financial performance after the crisis in the US and show this holds in other jurisdictions as 
well. Further, we complement the findings in [24], where the financial industry was not included in the 
analysis about the finance-responsibility performance nexus in relation to the global financial crisis, as 
well as those of [13], who did not explicitly account for responsibility. We also extend the analysis of 
[23,24] regarding the role of the legal system in the finance-responsibility nexus. Last is that we extend 
the research of [18] regarding the role of bank supervision. Further research is required to develop a 
grounding framework for why and how institutions and development exactly influence the nexus in 
relation to the global financial crisis.  
Our study contributes to the literature on the responsibility of banks by systematically 
investigating competing hypotheses for a large and international sample of firms. We rely on detailed 
bank specific performance measures where other studies use more general performance measures, 
because bank specific measures are more relevant as the economic function of banks is very different 
from that of other types of firms. At the same time, this is a limitation of our study as it is very hard to 
compare financial performance of banks with that of firms in other industries due to the specific 
operational and regulatory features of the banking industry. Therefore, the inter-industry comparison 
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can only be undertaken in a generic manner. Another limitation rests in the quality of the data about 
CSR. We use fine-grained indicators of responsibility, as advocated in [31], and show that this increases 
our understanding of the finance-responsibility nexus. However, we need to point out that 
responsibility cannot be directly observed and we use proxies, which might result in measurement error 
and underestimation [101]. As long as there are no generally accepted standards regarding their 
reporting and without independent external validation and auditing of such reports, we think it is hard 
to substantiate claims by rating organizations about firms’ responsibility and the results from studies 
using these data need to be handled with great care. We look forward to more direct, reliable and 
validated metrics regarding responsibility. We use a three stages equation system, which takes 
advantage of the correlation in error terms to arrive at estimates that are more efficient. There is no 
perfect estimation method to deal with endogeneity. The potential for a simultaneous effect between 
financial performance and responsibility scores is a limitation of our study. Future research could 
examine the cause-effect relationship between both variables, for example, by using lags in the 
specification of the models. 
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Firm-level corporate governance scores from ASSET4 with following 
components: 
(1) CGBF Board Functions 
(2) CGBS Board Structure 
(3) CGCP Compensation Policy 
(4) CGVS Vision and Strategy 
(5) CGSR Shareholder Rights 
ENVSCORE 
(Environmental Score) 
Firm-level environmental scores from ASSET4 with following components: 
(1) ENER Emission Reduction 
(2) ENPI Product Innovation 
(3) ENRR Resource Reduction 
SOCSCORE 
(Social Score) 
Firm-level social scores from ASSET4 with following components: 
(1) SOPR Product Responsibility 
(2) SOCO Community 
(3) SOHR Human Rights 
(4) SODO Diversity & Opportunity 
(5) SOEQ Employment Quality 
(6) SOHS Health & Safety 
(7) SOTD Training & Development 
Net Interest Margin 
(NIM) 
Ratio of net interest income to earning assets, which is the sum of total 
investment earning interest or dividends and net loans 
Tier1 Cap_Adq Ratio 
(TIER1) 
Tier1 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Non Performing Loans 
(NPL) 
Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
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Cost to Income Ratio 
(CIR) Ratio of total interest expense to total interest income 
Excess Stock Return 
(ESR) Annual buy and hold return in excess of local market return 
Size The natural logarithm of book value of assets in USD 
LoanDeposit Ratio of total loans to total deposits 




Average score of firm-level Governance/Environmental/Social (CSR) scores 
by country and year 
Mean_CSR SCORE 
(Country/Industry) 
Average score of firm-level Governance/Environmental/Social (CSR) scores 
by country and industry 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE (CGVSCORE): The corporate governance pillar measures 
a company’s systems and processes, which ensure that its board members and executives act in the best 
interests of its long-term shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity, through its use of best 
management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of 
incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate long-term shareholder value. 
Board of Directors/Board Functions (CGBF): The board of directors/board functions category 
measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice 
corporate governance principles related to board activities and functions. It reflects a company’s 
capacity to have an effective board by setting up the essential board committees with allocated tasks 
and responsibilities. 
Board of Directors/Board Structure (CGBS): The board of directors/board structure category 
measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice 
corporate governance principles related to a well-balanced membership of the board. It reflects a 
company’s capacity to ensure a critical exchange of ideas and an independent decision-making process 
through an experienced, diverse and independent board. 
Board of Directors/Compensation Policy (CGCP): The board of directors/compensation policy 
category measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards following best 
practice corporate governance principles related to competitive and proportionate management 
compensation. It reflects a company’s capacity to attract and retain executives and board members with 
the necessary skills by linking their compensation to individual or company-wide financial or extra-
financial targets. 
Integration/Vision and Strategy (CGVS): The integration/vision and strategy category measures a 
company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an overarching vision 
and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a company’s capacity to 
convincingly show and communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social and 
environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes. 
Shareholders/Shareholder Rights (CGSR): The shareholders/shareholder rights category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice corporate 
governance principles related to a shareholder policy and equal treatment of shareholders. It reflects a 
company’s capacity to be attractive to minority shareholders by ensuring them equal rights and 
privileges and by limiting the use of anti-takeover devices. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE (ENVSCORE): The environmental pillar measures a company’s 
impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete 
ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental 
risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to generate long-term shareholder value. 
Emission Reduction (ENER): The emission reduction category measures a company’s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards reducing environmental emission in the production and 
operational processes. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F-
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gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), waste, hazardous waste, water discharges, spills 
or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with environmental organizations to reduce the 
environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community. 
Product Innovation (ENPI): The product innovation category measures a company’s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards supporting the research and development of eco-efficient 
products or services. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce the environmental costs and burdens for 
its customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities through new environmental technologies 
and processes or eco-designed, dematerialized products with extended durability. 
Resource Reduction (ENRR): The resource reduction category measures a company’s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards achieving an efficient use of natural resources in the production 
process. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy or water, and to find 
more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management. 
SOCIAL SCORE (SOCSCORE): The social pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate trust 
and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best management practices. It 
is a reflection of the company’s reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors 
in determining its ability to generate long-term shareholder value. 
Customer/Product Responsibility (SOPR): The customer/product responsibility category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards creating value-added products and 
services upholding the customer’s security. It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its license to 
operate by producing quality goods and services integrating the customer’s health and safety, and 
preserving its integrity and privacy through accurate product information and labelling. 
Society/Community (SOCO): The society/community category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining the company’s reputation within the 
general community (local, national and global). It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its license 
to operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods or staff time, etc.), protecting public health 
(avoidance of industrial accidents, etc.) and respecting business ethics (avoiding bribery and corruption, 
etc.). 
Society/Human Rights (SOHR): The society/human rights category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards respecting the fundamental human rights 
conventions. It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its license to operate by guaranteeing the 
freedom of association and excluding child, forced or compulsory labor. 
Workforce/Diversity and Opportunity (SODO): The workforce/diversity and opportunity category 
measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining diversity and 
equal opportunities in its workforce. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty 
and productivity by promoting an effective life-work balance, a family friendly environment and equal 
opportunities regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. 
Workforce/Employment Quality (SOEQ): The workforce/employment quality category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-quality employment 
benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and 
productivity by distributing rewarding and fair employment benefits, and by focusing on long-term 
employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding lay-offs and maintaining 
relations with trade unions. 
Workforce/Health & Safety (SOHS): The workforce/health & safety category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards providing a healthy and safe workplace. It reflects 
a company’s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and productivity by integrating into its day-to-
day operations a concern for the physical and mental health, well-being and stress level of all employees. 
Workforce/Training and Development (SOTD): The workforce/training and development category 
measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards providing training and 
development (education) for its workforce. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its intellectual 
capital, workforce loyalty and productivity by developing the workforce’s skills, competences, 
employability and careers in an entrepreneurial environment. 
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Appendix B. Sample countries and composition of the sample. This table reports the number of 
firm/year observations available for banking sector in ASSET4 by country with availability of all 
variables for financial performance and responsibility scores. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. 









Australia 67  Common Single NonCB 
Austria 23  Civil Multiple NonCB 
Belgium 23  Civil Single NonCB 
Brazil 39 Low Civil Single CB 
Canada 86  Common Single NonCB 
Chile 23 Low Civil Single NonCB 
China 67 Low Civil Single NonCB 
Colombia 14 Low Civil Single NonCB 
Czech Republic 8  Civil Single CB 
Denmark 33 High Civil Multiple NonCB 
Egypt 16  Civil Single CB 
Finland 10  Civil Single NonCB 
France 48  Civil Single CB 
Germany 54  Civil Multiple NonCB 
Greece 65 Low Civil Single CB 
Hong Kong 61 Low Common Single CB 
Hungary 5 Low Civil Single NonCB 
India 57 Low Common Single CB 
Indonesia 25 Low Civil Single CB 
Ireland 25 High Common Single CB 
Israel 26 Low Common Single CB 
Italy 122 Low Civil Single CB 
Japan 242  Civil Single NonCB 
Korea, Rep. 41 Low Civil Single NonCB 
Malaysia 53 Low Common Single CB 
Mexico 18 Low Civil Single NonCB 
Netherlands 4 High Civil Single CB 
Norway 11 High Civil Single NonCB 
Philippines 25 Low Civil Single CB 
Poland 52 Low Civil Single NonCB 
Portugal 23 Low Civil Single CB 
Qatar 14   Single  
Russian Federation 19 Low Civil Single CB 
Saudi Arabia 10  Common Single CB 
Singapore 34 Low Common Single CB 
South Africa 34 Low Common Single CB 
Spain 88 Low Civil Single CB 
Sweden 47 High Civil Single NonCB 
Switzerland 38 High Civil Single NonCB 
Taiwan, China 60  Civil Multiple NonCB 
Thailand 41 Low Common Single CB 
Turkey 44 Low Civil Single CB 
United Arab Emir. 5   Single CB 
United Kingdom 87  Common Single NonCB 
United States 545 High Common Multiple CB 
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Appendix C. The relationship between responsibility scores and financial performance. This table reports OLS and WLS estimations for 
simultaneous equation system of the relationship between responsibility scores and bank specific financial performance measures for the 
effect of crisis years with CGVSCORE, ENVSCORE, and SOCSCORE. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. All regressions control 
year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
Corporate governance (CGVSCORE) 
 OLS Estimations  WLS Estimations 
 NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 0.918 *** 0.829 *** 0.978 *** 0.597 *** −0.064 *** 0.911 *** 0.808 *** 0.957 *** 0.417 *** −0.03 
 [0.012] [0.032] [0.019] [0.042] [0.024] [0.017] [0.028] [0.023] [0.083] [0.028] 
CGVSCORE 0.105 *** 0.525 *** 0.056 0.009 −0.029 0.062 0.749 *** −0.128 0.021 −0.009 
 [0.030] [0.181] [0.120] [0.016] [0.019] [0.050] [0.274] [0.174] [0.028] [0.030] 
Size −0.029 *** −0.007 0 0.013 *** −0.010 * −0.030 ** −0.005 0.028 0.016 *** −0.018 ** 
 [0.008] [0.045] [0.024] [0.003] [0.005] [0.012] [0.060] [0.043] [0.006] [0.008] 
LoanDeposit −0.031 0.162 0.929 *** 0.062 *** −0.040 ** −0.053 0.285 0.687 *** 0.070 *** −0.052 * 
 [0.027] [0.187] [0.147] [0.011] [0.019] [0.032] [0.204] [0.167] [0.025] [0.028] 
Pr.Crd.GDP −0.02 0.17 0.009 −0.062 *** −0.059 *** −0.056 0.168 0.127 −0.036 ** −0.052 *** 
 [0.026] [0.104] [0.066] [0.010] [0.012] [0.034] [0.142] [0.094] [0.014] [0.016] 
Constant 0.659 *** 2.143 −1.334 ** −0.088 0.514 *** 0.907 *** 2.159 −1.495 * −0.035 0.659 *** 
 [0.183] [1.814] [0.528] [0.059] [0.108] [0.231] [2.135] [0.904] [0.104] [0.166] 
R-squared 0.926 0.753 0.86 0.655 0.083 0.937 0.732 0.841 0.429 0.127 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.008 * 0.004 ** 0.001 0.045 −0.005 0.004 0.003 0.00 0.034 −0.008 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.046] [0.014] [0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.057] [0.018] 
Size 0.064 *** 0.061 *** 0.059 *** 0.052 *** 0.057 *** 0.060 *** 0.048 *** 0.054 *** 0.048 *** 0.052 *** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] 
LoanDeposit −0.004 0.045 * −0.002 −0.005 0.005 0.008 0.055 * 0.005 0.019 0.007 
 [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.030] [0.023] [0.029] [0.032] [0.029] [0.033] [0.028] 
Mean_SCORE 0.383 *** 0.238 *** 0.360 *** 0.311 *** 0.368 *** 0.292 *** 0.194 ** 0.284 *** 0.224 *** 0.270 *** 
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(Country/Year) [0.071] [0.082] [0.074] [0.082] [0.072] [0.076] [0.087] [0.074] [0.080] [0.073] 
Mean_SCORE 0.650 *** 0.757 *** 0.671 *** 0.685 *** 0.665 *** 0.738 *** 0.789 *** 0.718 *** 0.763 *** 0.730 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.075] [0.080] [0.079] [0.092] [0.075] [0.081] [0.088] [0.082] [0.091] [0.079] 
Constant −1.261 *** −1.283 *** −1.157 *** −0.976 *** −1.108 *** −1.251 *** −1.095 *** −1.127 *** −0.973 *** −1.062 *** 
 [0.144] [0.171] [0.129] [0.133] [0.125] [0.208] [0.215] [0.180] [0.186] [0.174] 
R-squared 0.669 0.668 0.662 0.596 0.673 0.622 0.613 0.613 0.62 0.636 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
Environmental Score (ENVSCORE) 
 OLS Estimations  WLS Estimations 
 NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 0.922 *** 0.829 *** 0.976 *** 0.593 *** −0.063 *** 0.911 *** 0.813 *** 0.954 *** 0.412 *** −0.032 
 [0.011] [0.031] [0.019] [0.043] [0.024] [0.016] [0.028] [0.023] [0.084] [0.028] 
ENVSCORE −0.017 0.556 *** 0.181 0.021 −0.01 0.04 0.390 * 0.253 0.031 −0.034 
 [0.037] [0.183] [0.158] [0.015] [0.022] [0.077] [0.215] [0.197] [0.023] [0.028] 
Size −0.017 −0.077 −0.03 0.010 *** −0.01 −0.032 * −0.004 −0.023 0.014 * −0.014 
 [0.011] [0.059] [0.037] [0.004] [0.007] [0.018] [0.070] [0.053] [0.007] [0.010] 
LoanDeposit −0.017 0.189 0.923 *** 0.061 *** −0.043 ** −0.054 0.303 0.665 *** 0.068 *** −0.050 * 
 [0.027] [0.183] [0.144] [0.011] [0.019] [0.033] [0.204] [0.163] [0.026] [0.028] 
Pr.Crd.GDP 0.002 0.282 *** 0.026 −0.059 *** −0.064 *** −0.047 0.288 ** 0.099 −0.032 ** −0.054 *** 
 [0.026] [0.099] [0.061] [0.008] [0.012] [0.035] [0.136] [0.088] [0.013] [0.018] 
Constant 0.458 ** 3.269 * −0.84 −0.038 0.512 *** 0.924 *** 2.057 −0.663 0.011 0.589 *** 
 [0.221] [1.914] [0.680] [0.072] [0.123] [0.306] [2.174] [0.996] [0.117] [0.183] 
R-squared 0.926 0.753 0.86 0.655 0.082 0.937 0.73 0.841 0.43 0.128 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.005 0.008 *** 0.004 * 0.036 −0.023 0.002 0 0.005 ** 0.05 −0.024 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.061] [0.018] [0.006] [0.004] [0.002] [0.073] [0.021] 
Size 0.137 *** 0.140 *** 0.137 *** 0.129 *** 0.130 *** 0.110 *** 0.097 *** 0.109 *** 0.094 *** 0.097 *** 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] 
LoanDeposit −0.009 0.003 −0.009 −0.049 0.003 −0.009 0.024 −0.007 0.002 0.004 
 [0.031] [0.036] [0.030] [0.035] [0.030] [0.033] [0.040] [0.032] [0.043] [0.034] 
Mean_SCORE 0.063 0.048 0.01 0.246 ** 0.023 0.179 * 0.128 0.14 0.202 * 0.125 
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(Country/Year) [0.090] [0.103] [0.091] [0.096] [0.086] [0.095] [0.121] [0.105] [0.114] [0.100] 
Mean_SCORE 0.700 *** 0.717 *** 0.676 *** 0.677 *** 0.708 *** 0.762 *** 0.787 *** 0.699 *** 0.744 *** 0.762 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.056] [0.064] [0.059] [0.064] [0.055] [0.067] [0.081] [0.077] [0.080] [0.070] 
Constant −2.495 *** −2.586 *** −2.465 *** −2.348 *** −2.357 *** −2.123 *** −1.754 *** −2.072 *** −1.822 *** −1.859 *** 
 [0.180] [0.231] [0.166] [0.180] [0.164] [0.222] [0.251] [0.202] [0.233] [0.205] 
R-squared 0.588 0.608 0.592 0.596 0.59 0.579 0.578 0.564 0.561 0.576 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
Social Score (SOCSCORE) 
 OLS Estimations  WLS Estimations 
 NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 0.921 *** 0.825 *** 0.977 *** 0.594 *** −0.065 *** 0.909 *** 0.811 *** 0.958 *** 0.417 *** −0.031 
 [0.011] [0.032] [0.019] [0.043] [0.024] [0.016] [0.028] [0.023] [0.083] [0.029] 
SOCSCORE 0.015 0.821 *** 0.215 0.016 −0.036 0.083 0.428 −0.067 0.006 −0.028 
 [0.049] [0.241] [0.167] [0.015] [0.027] [0.107] [0.282] [0.228] [0.021] [0.040] 
Size −0.023 * −0.1 −0.029 0.012 *** −0.007 −0.037 * −0.001 0.026 0.017 ** −0.015 
 [0.012] [0.061] [0.034] [0.004] [0.007] [0.021] [0.073] [0.055] [0.007] [0.011] 
LoanDeposit −0.02 0.114 0.911 *** 0.061 *** −0.039 ** −0.058 * 0.3 0.685 *** 0.070 *** −0.051 * 
 [0.028] [0.195] [0.144] [0.011] [0.020] [0.034] [0.211] [0.170] [0.025] [0.029] 
Pr.Crd.GDP 0.004 0.344 *** 0.038 −0.059 *** −0.067 *** −0.046 0.313 ** 0.102 −0.031 ** −0.055 *** 
 [0.026] [0.100] [0.062] [0.008] [0.013] [0.035] [0.143] [0.089] [0.013] [0.019] 
Constant 0.544 ** 3.582 * −0.898 −0.061 0.461 *** 1.011 *** 1.958 −1.45 −0.048 0.618 *** 
 [0.235] [1.943] [0.635] [0.065] [0.128] [0.350] [2.191] [1.065] [0.105] [0.201] 
R-squared 0.926 0.754 0.86 0.655 0.083 0.937 0.73 0.841 0.429 0.128 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 0.016 *** 0.009 *** 0.002 0.037 −0.033 ** 0.012 ** 0.003 0.001 −0.009 −0.02 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.049] [0.017] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.062] [0.021] 
Size 0.119 *** 0.114 *** 0.110 *** 0.109 *** 0.107 *** 0.102 *** 0.084 *** 0.092 *** 0.085 *** 0.084 *** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] 
LoanDeposit −0.007 0.021 −0.014 −0.039 0.008 0.009 0.018 −0.011 0.016 0.007 
 [0.031] [0.035] [0.033] [0.037] [0.031] [0.030] [0.039] [0.031] [0.039] [0.031] 
Mean_SCORE 0.216 *** 0.166 * 0.185 ** 0.296 *** 0.158 * 0.209 *** 0.182 * 0.240 *** 0.226 ** 0.182 ** 
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(Country/Year) [0.080] [0.091] [0.084] [0.090] [0.081] [0.080] [0.107] [0.091] [0.103] [0.085] 
Mean_SCORE 0.694 *** 0.763 *** 0.711 *** 0.662 *** 0.726 *** 0.732 *** 0.787 *** 0.718 *** 0.757 *** 0.763 *** 
(Country/Industry) [0.057] [0.061] [0.060] [0.063] [0.057] [0.071] [0.087] [0.075] [0.088] [0.074] 
Constant −2.197 *** −2.248 *** −2.008 *** −1.940 *** −1.937 *** −1.954 *** −1.567 *** −1.747 *** −1.564 *** −1.592 *** 
 [0.163] [0.186] [0.148] [0.150] [0.144] [0.212] [0.256] [0.208] [0.230] [0.206] 
R-squared 0.593 0.643 0.595 0.582 0.597 0.584 0.58 0.569 0.566 0.586 
Observations 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 2200 1611 2155 1717 2338 
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Appendix D. VIF scores. This table reports Variance of Inflation 
Factor (VIF) scores in the main regressions. 
 NIM Tier1 NPL CIR ESR 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 1.29 1.28 1.15 1.65 1.09 
CGVSCORE 1.26 1.23 1.22 1.54 1.21 
Size 1.29 1.27 1.12 1.23 1.12 
LoanDeposit 1.19 1.16 1.2 1.19 1.18 
Pr.Crd.GDP 1.39 1.2 1.24 1.59 1.24 
CGVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 1.15 1.2 1.21 1.69 1.09 
Size 1.2 1.16 1.08 1.14 1.08 
LoanDeposit 1.06 1.06 1.14 1.2 1.06 
Mean_SCORE (Country/Year) 4.57 5.02 4.6 4.2 4.77 
Mean_SCORE (Country/Industry) 4.77 4.97 4.87 4.28 4.94 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 1.25 1.27 1.14 1.68 1.09 
ENVSCORE 1.84 1.91 1.9 1.85 1.85 
Size 1.93 2.06 1.88 1.83 1.83 
LoanDeposit 1.17 1.13 1.18 1.2 1.16 
Pr.Crd.GDP 1.22 1.11 1.14 1.2 1.14 
ENVSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 1.29 1.18 1.18 1.66 1.08 
Size 1.35 1.35 1.3 1.25 1.31 
LoanDeposit 1.26 1.23 1.28 1.51 1.23 
Mean_SCORE (Country/Year) 1.5 1.33 1.36 1.64 1.33 
Mean_SCORE (Country/Industry) 1.47 1.43 1.51 1.58 1.49 
Financial Performance Equation 
Financial Performance_lag1 1.26 1.29 1.13 1.67 1.09 
SOCSCORE 1.77 1.89 1.78 1.78 1.78 
Size 1.82 1.91 1.67 1.72 1.66 
LoanDeposit 1.2 1.17 1.2 1.2 1.19 
Pr.Crd.GDP 1.24 1.16 1.17 1.22 1.18 
SOCSCORE Equation 
Financial Performance 1.17 1.19 1.18 1.66 1.08 
Size 1.31 1.25 1.19 1.22 1.2 
LoanDeposit 1.43 1.42 1.47 1.49 1.42 
Mean_SCORE (Country/Year) 1.63 1.6 1.66 1.62 1.61 
Mean_SCORE (Country/Industry) 1.61 1.53 1.61 1.63 1.6 
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Appendix E. Descriptive statistics of country sample along per capita income, legal origin, and organization of banking supervision. This table 
reports the number of firm/year observations and the mean values of responsibility scores and financial performance measures by per capita income, 
legal origin, and organization of banking supervision. The definitions of variables are in Appendix A. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. The 
significance of differences between means is based on a t-test for mean differences, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels.  
Comparisons Based on Income Level with the Bottom and Top 40 Percentile of GDP per Capita by Year 
 Low Income Countries High Income Countries Low vs. High 
 Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Comparisons in Means 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean Post - Pre N Mean N Mean N Mean Post-Pre Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
CGVSCORE 1061 39.95 177 37.63 694 42.53 4.901 ** 775 64.03 252 69.14 644 64.46 −4.68 *** −24.07 *** −31.51 *** −21.93 *** 
ENVSCORE 1061 51.90 177 51.19 694 53.80 2.605 775 41.75 252 40.10 644 41.39 1.29 10.14 *** 11.10 *** 12.41 *** 
SOCSCORE 1061 60.47 177 60.98 694 61.53 0.553 775 48.03 252 56.35 644 47.91 −8.44 *** 12.45 *** 4.63 13.62 *** 
NIM 1061 0.031 177 0.025 694 0.033 0.008 *** 775 0.029 252 0.028 644 0.029 0.001 * 0.002 *** −0.003 *** 0.004 *** 
Tier1 820 0.114 53 0.094 608 0.119 0.025 *** 618 0.126 108 0.092 493 0.128 0.037 *** −0.011 *** 0.003 −0.009 *** 
NPL 971 0.041 158 0.018 634 0.048 0.031 *** 751 0.020 236 0.006 622 0.019 0.012 *** 0.021 *** 0.011 *** 0.030 *** 
CIR 796 0.469 116 0.551 563 0.446 −0.105 *** 744 0.351 231 0.500 620 0.340 −0.160 *** 0.118 *** 0.051 *** 0.105 *** 
ESR 1061 0.033 177 0.027 694 0.030 0.003 775 −0.008 252 −0.018 644 0.002 0.020 * 0.041 *** 0.045 ** 0.028 
Comparisons Based on legal Origin 
 Civil Law Countries Common Law Countries Civil vs. Common 
 Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Comparisons in Means 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean Post - Pre N Mean N Mean N Mean Post-Pre Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
CGVSCORE 1184 33.80 298 30.69 683 35.81 5.118 *** 1116 63.11 307 69.91 636 60.24 −9.67 *** −29.32 *** −39.22 *** −24.43 *** 
ENVSCORE 1184 53.27 298 50.52 683 55.23 4.709 ** 1116 46.09 307 44.66 636 47.03 2.37 7.18 *** 5.86 ** 8.20 *** 
SOCSCORE 1184 56.96 298 56.67 683 57.37 0.700 1116 54.15 307 59.55 636 51.39 −8.16 *** 2.81 ** −2.88 5.98 *** 
NIM 1184 0.025 298 0.019 683 0.027 0.008 *** 1116 0.029 307 0.028 636 0.030 0.002 *** −0.004 *** −0.009 *** −0.003 *** 
Tier1 846 0.115 85 0.093 588 0.122 0.029 *** 907 0.120 126 0.092 616 0.128 0.036 *** −0.005 *** 0.001 −0.006 *** 
NPL 1055 0.040 258 0.024 611 0.049 0.026 *** 1088 0.019 292 0.008 625 0.024 0.017 *** 0.021 *** 0.016 *** 0.025 *** 
CIR 757 0.477 132 0.618 513 0.426 −0.191 *** 1033 0.384 297 0.511 578 0.311 −0.200 *** 0.093 *** 0.106 *** 0.115 *** 
ESR 1184 0.026 298 0.048 683 0.013 −0.035 ** 1116 0.015 307 −0.021 636 0.035 0.056 *** 0.012 0.070 *** −0.022 
Comparisons Based on Number of Supervisory Authorities 
 
Countries with Single Bank Supervisory Authorities 
(Single) 
Countries with Multiple Bank Supervisory Authorities 
(Multiple) 
Single vs. Multiple 
 Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Comparisons in Means 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean Post - Pre N Mean N Mean N Mean Post - Pre Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
CGVSCORE 1717 41.32 395 42.56 1040 41.61 −0.949 715 57.37 210 65.70 396 52.74 −12.97 *** −16.05 *** −23.14 *** −11.13 *** 
ENVSCORE 1717 54.24 395 55.93 1040 54.36 −1.571 715 35.90 210 31.77 396 38.10 6.33 ** 18.34 *** 24.17 *** 16.26 *** 
SOCSCORE 1717 59.26 395 62.06 1040 58.36 −3.702 ** 715 43.13 210 50.75 396 38.72 −12.03 *** 16.13 *** 11.32 *** 19.64 *** 
NIM 1717 0.026 395 0.020 1040 0.028 0.008 *** 715 0.030 210 0.030 396 0.030 0.000 −0.004 *** −0.010 *** −0.002 ** 
Tier1 1289 0.116 115 0.094 928 0.122 0.028 *** 563 0.122 96 0.090 364 0.131 0.041 *** −0.006 *** 0.004 −0.009 *** 
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NPL 1585 0.035 352 0.019 966 0.041 0.022 *** 681 0.017 198 0.008 380 0.020 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.012 *** 0.021 *** 
CIR 1219 0.474 231 0.596 810 0.430 −0.166 *** 694 0.326 198 0.484 392 0.234 −0.250 *** 0.148 *** 0.112 *** 0.196 *** 
ESR 1717 0.036 395 0.026 1040 0.030 0.004 ** 715 −0.006 210 −0.011 396 0.015 0.026 0.042 *** 0.036 * 0.015 
Comparisons Based on Central Bank Supervision 
 
Countries with Supervision Outside of the Central Bank 
(Non CB) 
Countries with Supervision by the Central Bank 
(CB) 
Non CB vs. CB 
 Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Comparison Comparisons in Means 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean Post - Pre N Mean N Mean N Mean Post - Pre Total Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
CGVSCORE 1001 38.24 248 43.72 596 36.11 −7.616 *** 1417 51.90 357 55.36 828 51.33 −4.04 ** −13.65 *** −11.64 *** −15.22 *** 
ENVSCORE 1001 55.46 248 56.64 596 55.19 −1.452 *** 1417 44.51 357 41.22 828 46.54 5.32 ** 10.95 *** 15.42 *** 8.65 *** 
SOCSCORE 1001 56.02 248 61.34 596 53.66 −7.680 1417 53.76 357 55.91 828 52.88 −3.03 2.26 * 5.43 ** 0.77 
NIM 1001 0.020 248 0.017 596 0.022 0.005 *** 1417 0.032 357 0.028 828 0.033 0.005 *** −0.011 *** −0.011 *** −0.011 *** 
Tier1 705 0.113 75 0.092 497 0.119 0.027 *** 1133 0.120 136 0.093 783 0.128 0.035 *** −0.008 *** −0.001 −0.009 *** 
NPL 900 0.023 223 0.019 534 0.025 0.006 *** 1352 0.034 327 0.013 800 0.043 0.030 *** −0.011 *** 0.006 *** −0.018 *** 
CIR 742 0.484 157 0.656 489 0.416 −0.239 *** 1157 0.380 272 0.479 701 0.331 −0.148 *** 0.104 *** 0.176 *** 0.085 *** 
ESR 1001 0.039 248 0.026 596 0.041 0.015 1417 0.012 357 0.004 828 0.014 0.010 0.027 ** 0.022 0.027 ** 
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